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Abstract: Concerned with the equation of risk management behaviours, the research analyses 
whether risk management in context of armed conflict is different to that observed during natural 
disasters and economic crises. Based on the case study of the West Bank during 2000-2004, this 
investigation uses primary data about household’s perceptions, the Palestinian Expenditure and 
Consumption Survey and a conflict data set to explore how the characteristics of the occupation-
produced shocks unfold into the household’s risk management. The distinctive features observed in 
the risk-related behaviour of West Bank Palestinians indicate that the standard risk management 
framework needs to be adapted to intregate the endogenous, multidimensional and dynamic nature 
of conflict-produced shocks. 
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‘Famine here is a special case…We can be starving one day because 
there is no supply of food, and we can have more food than we even need 
another day because we can freely fish and cultivate our lands and go to 
work…Food security to us is mostly related to the political 
situation….We are food secure if the Israelis leave us alone and stop 
trying to make our lives a nightmare. If they do that, then we can be food 
secure because we can earn a living, cultivate our land, raise our animals, 
eat fish and import food as we desire.’  A Palestinian, Ash-Shaate 
Refugee Camp, the Gaza Strip, 2007 
 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
The paper presents the results of the PhD Thesis ´Coping, Adapting and Resisting: A Critical 
Analysis of Risk Management during Armed Conflict’. The objective of this research is to 
contribute to the understanding of how people deal with anticipated and actual losses associated 
with the uncertain events and outcomes produced by socio-political shocks
3.  
 
Risk is a central feature and factor of life of all communities and its management has been one of 
the most challenging preoccupations of mankind. In development research the study of risk has 
gained relevance due to the findings of studies on inter-temporal welfare dynamics, which show 
large fluctuations in income over relatively short periods of time, suggesting substantial short-term 
movements into and out of poverty
4 (Baulch and Hoddinott, 1999). One of the central motivating 
factors in the dynamics of poverty is the risk event, whose characteristics in terms of spread, 
predictability and intensity largely contributes to explaining the fact why most of the poor are ‘not 
always poor’ but ‘sometimes poor’. However, in much analysis on development and in the design 
of anti-poverty policies, risk has largely remained on the periphery, ‘an add-on in more general 
analyses’ (Dercon, 2005: 2).  
 
According to Beck (1998), although risk is a commonly used term, applied to nearly every human 
action, yet it remains poorly understood and poorly defined because the analysis of risk 
management hinges crucially on its definition. Generally, risk is composed of a cause, about which 
there may be some uncertainty, and an effect or impact about which there may also be some 
uncertainty
5. Despite the importance of the causes of risk for its understanding, risk is commonly 
                                                            
3 The term shocks connotes risk events that are unexpected and are of high magnitude, and produce high 
damage due to their concentration on persons of high vulnerability and low resilience (Payne and Lipton, 
1994). Based on the characteristics of the risk events produced during armed conflict this investigation uses 
both terms, shock and risk event, interchangeably. 
4 Most panel data suggest that between one-fifth and half the people below a ‘poverty line’ at the time of the 
survey are not ususally poor, but have been pushed into poverty, sometimes by life-ccyle events but ofen by 
damaging fluctuations (Sinha and Lipton, 1999).  
5 Economists have referred to risk as uncertain events (probability of occurrence) and outcomes (expected 
utility) with a known or an unknown probability distribution (Sinha and Lipton, 1999).   4
understood through two of its elements - uncertainty and impact -, and classified by impact 
variables - the occurrence level (micro, meso, and macro), the spread (idiosyncratic or covariate), 
the severity and the frequency of shocks (Sinha and Lipton, 1999).  
 
In this sense, it is not surprising that risk-related behaviours are equated regardless of the nature of 
the risk event, whether it is natural, health-related, social, economic, political and environmental. 
Since most of the knowledge on risk management is drawn from contexts of natural disasters, 
economic or health-related crises (e.g. Alderman 1996; Besley, 1995; Dercon, 1996; Dercon and 
Krishnan, 1996; Devereux, 1992; Fafchamps, 1992; Morduch, 1991; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 
1993; Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; Udry, 1995), this is used as the standard framework to 
understand risk management; and within these lens researchers and development practitioners 
approach the risk-related behaviour of households during conflict. Although there have been 
important contributions in recent years (e.g. Verpoorten, 2007; Bundervoet, 2007; Körpf, 2004; 
Bozzoli et al. 2010; Nandi and Maio, 2010; Brück et al., 2010b) Goodhand et al., 2000; UNSCO, 
2005; Nillesen and Verwimp, 2010b), there is a need to research the effects of armed conflict on 
risk management. 
 
Addressing this gap is important not only to to understand the vulnerability of households in 
conflict but also to challenge the common mismatch between the structures and institutions of 
international aid and the characteristics and dynamics of armed conflicts (Leader, 2000).  
 
For example, in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there is a disconnection between the 
facts on the ground and the diplomatic policies of international action, foreign aid policies and 
programmes (Keating et al., 2005). The paradox of the last decade is that, although the explicit aim 
of donor’s assistance has been to support the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, donors do not 
recognised the process of territorial fragmentation produced by the construction of the Wall
6, the 
Israeli policy of closure and the expansion of the settlement structures; and act as if aid could be 
effective in the absence of a political settlement; as if the development effort in the occupied 
Palestinian territories (oPt) could proceed independently of the evolution of the bilateral political 
process and developments in Israel and in the oPt (Le More, 2005).  
 
                                                            
6 The Wall has been differently defined: Security Fence by the Israelis, Separation Barrier by the UN 
Secretary General and the donor community in the field; and the Wall by the Palestinians, the UN General 
Assembly and the International Court of Justice. Taking into account the different historical and national 
narratives, the high level of political sensitivity surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian and the need to abide by 
the highest standards of accuracy and impartiality, the terms used in this paper have been considered and 
selected in full knowledge of their meaning and implications of their usage.    5
By working around on accommodating the realities being experienced by the Palestinians and 
being used as a means to keep the peace process going, aid has facilitated the disconnection 
between the diplomatic efforts and what is taking place on the ground (Shearer and Meyer, 2005). 
The aid programmes and policies, in spite of the proven causality between the Israeli policy of 
closure and the construction of the Wall and the reduction in Palestinian welfare (World Bank, 
2004b; UNCTAD, 2006; OCHA, 2007), assume risk events transitory and leave the causes out of 
the picture. By ignoring the root causes, the aid programmes and policies equate the risk-related 
behaviours of households in conflict with that observed during natural disasters or economic crises, 
and defined vulnerability as an economic failure masking the collapse of livelihoods and locking 
the Palestinians into a vicious circle of economic subsistence and ex-post coping, which enables 
people to stand still by preventing them moving ahead.  
 
Motivated by this scenario and the gap in the literature on risk management of households in 
conflict, the research pursuits the hypothesis that risk management - determinants and strategies - 
to anticipated and actual losses associated with the risk events and outcomes produced by armed 
conflicts is not the same as the risk management produced by covariate natural or economic shocks. 
In order to test this hypothesis two questions have been posed: why is the standard risk 
management framework developed for low-income countries not suitable to contexts of armed 
conflict? How do the specific characteristics of conflicts unfold into the risk management? These 
questions are addressed by, on the one hand, merging the literature on risk management in 
developing countries with the studies of armed conflicts, particularly the Complex Emergency 
approach; and on the other hand, by an empirical study of the West Bank during the Second 
Intifada, which relies on the Palestinian Expenditure and Consumption Survey (PECS), primary 
data about households own perceptions of risk events and strategies, and a conflict data set.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature bringing forward the 
elements of why the standard framework of risk management is not suitable to context of armed 
conflict. Section 3 describes the case study, the research methods and the data. Section 4 discusses 
the results around the three elements of risk management: the risk events, the strategies, and the 
factors influencing choice and output. Section 5 concludes and proposes steps for future analysis.  
 
2. Why is the Risk Management Framework not Suitable for Contexts of Armed Conflict? 
 
The risk management debate was firstly motivated by discussions on rational behaviour in pre-
market societies. During the 1960s this was an issue of discussion among anthropologists, whether 
substantivists or formalists. While the former argued that choices of behaviour in pre-market 
societies were not economically rational as individuals were motivated by the principles of   6
reciprocity and redistribution (Dalton, 1961; Cook, 1966), the latter argue that individuals in pre-
market societies are capable of rational-maximizing behaviour and that conventional economic 
theory is fully applicable to pre-market societies (Posner, 1980).  
 
This unsettled debate stimulated further research within the different disciplines. On the one hand, 
economists carried out studies to assess households’ rational allocation decisions and the aversion 
and preferences towards risk in developing countries. Although there are divergent views (Antle, 
1987), the majority of the studies concluded that farmers do take rational choices, mostly 
determined by moderate risk aversion (Binswanger, 18980; Hazell, 1982). Alderman and Paxson 
(1992) did not agree with the findings as they ignored other factors that may overestimate or 
underestimate the level of risk aversion. According to them, the well-known problems of 
information asymmetries and deficiencies in the ability to enforce contracts as a result of 
incomplete or absent insurance and credit markets may explain why households in developing 
countries will not effectively manage risk
7. 
 
On the other hand, social scientists joined the debate and carried out extensive research exploring 
household responses to drought (e.g. Jodha, 1975; Watts, 1983). They found that households are 
not irrational or passive victims but rational actors taking proactive short and long term responses 
to deal with adverse events even in the context of imperfect credit and insurance markets. Parallel 
to these studies, Sen formalized the Entitlement approach and put forward important aspects for the 
debate of risk management in developing countries (Sen, 1981). According to Sen, vulnerability to 
famine is largely attributable to one’s ability to command food through all legal means, and that 
such ability is determined by one’s ownership of tangible assets and the rate at which one can 
exchange these for food. This approach challenged the view of supply-side aspects such as the 
existence of credit and insurance schemes and gave significant relevance to demand failure in the 
causes of famine. 
 
This emphasis on demand-failure opened a big window for exploring household responses to crisis 
in the following decade. During the 1990s, a large body of research, focusing on the relationship 
between household responses and the characteristics (spread, predictability and intensity) of the 
risk events has illustrated the wealth of behavioural and institutional responses that emerge to fill 
the holes left by market failures. As regards the process, they observed that risk management is a 
forward-looking, dynamic and comprehensive process, where households juggle between different 
actions simultaneously and the choice of the mechanism depend on the relative costs and benefits 
                                                            
7 A great part of the studies on risk management has been interested in the relationship between financial 
markets and the effectiveness of risk management, the latter measured in terms of consumption and income 
smoothing. It has been particularly explored within the theories of consumption see for example Bhalla 
(1980), Deaton (1991, 1992, 1997), Zeldes (1989), Morduch (1995), Udry (1990, 1994).    7
of each strategy within a competing set of short-term consumption and long-term sustainability 
(Davies, 1996; Corbett, 1989; Devereux, 1992, 1993, 1999). Households manage (at least partially) 
to limit consumption risk by embarking on informal risk management strategies, which range from 
informal credit, savings and insurance schemes, solidarity networks and self-insurance strategies 
such as income smoothing strategies and the accumulation and de-accumulation of assets, the so-
called ‘buffer-stock strategy’. The mechanisms have been categorized differently, for example, if 
they are formal (market- and state-based) and informal, individual, household or community based; 
whether they aim to reduce, mitigate and cope with risks (Holzman and Jorgensen, 2000); to reduce 
the ex-ante riskiness of the income-process (risk management) or the ex-post impact of the shock 
(coping strategies) (Alderman and Paxson, 1992); or whether they pursuit to smooth consumption 
or income (Morduch, 1995).  
 
Income smoothing strategies are adopted in response to continuous exposure and they aim to affect 
the ex-ante riskiness of the income process by reducing income variability through actions that 
change the asset base or change the mix of income-generating activities from a given asset base 
(Morduch, 1995). Reallocations occur among assets whose returns are less than perfectly 
correlated, or into assets with less variable returns (Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993). 
Theoretically, as long as the different income sources are not perfectly covariate, then there will be 
a reduction in total income risk from combining two income sources with the same mean and 
variance or through income-skewing, i.e. resources are allocated towards low risk low return 
activities (Dercon, 2000). Income smoothing strategies can also be ex-post strategies, adopted 
when a crisis looms and are particularly important when the shock is economy-wide. When a large 
negative shock occurs, both the usual household activities and the local income earnings are 
unlikely to be sufficient and households need to intensify the usual income-based strategies and 
adopt additional actions to prevent destitution such as labour supply adjustments, increased labour 
force participation, temporary migration, longer working days, etc. (e.g. Kochar, 1999; Dercon and 
Krishnan 1996; Ellis, 2000). 
 
Consumption smoothing strategies are usually adopted when the principal source of production and 
insurance strategies have failed and aim to cope with an unusually severe or unexpected shock
8. 
They can be classified into those that smooth consumption inter-temporally through saving 
behaviour and those that smooth consumption spatially, through risk sharing. Inter-temporal 
smoothing may be accomplished through borrowing and lending in formal and informal markets, 
accumulating and selling assets and storing goods for future consumption. Risk sharing 
                                                            
8 The implications of unpredictable shocks have been studied by the theories of Life Cycle and Permanent 
Income hypothesis (Romer, 1996; Carroll, 1997) as well as the buffer-stock model (e.g. Deaton, 1992; 
Zeldes, 1989; Alderman, 1996)   8
arrangements may be accomplished through formal institutions (such as insurance and futures 
markets, and forward contracts) and informal mechanisms including state-contingent transfers and 
solidarity transfers between friends, neighbours, relatives, professional groups etc. Generally, when 
shocks are repeated over time and the crisis becomes chronic and its effects permanent, 
consumption smoothing strategies are overall more difficult since the crisis exhausts the means and 
the available strategies are less effective
9. One of the questions widely addressed by economic 
studies on risk management has been whether covariate shocks limit consumption smoothing. For 
example, while risk sharing is less effective during society-wide shocks because the risk can not 
pooled among members in the group (e.g. Townsend, 1994; Fafchamps, 1992; Besley, 1995), self-
insurance through savings becomes a usual mechanism although it is affected by the drop in the 
asset’s rate of return and terms of trade produced by covariate shocks (e.g. Deaton, 1997; Udry, 
1994; Devereux, 1993).  
 
All these studies highlight the limitations and opportunities of the strategies according to the 
spread, intensity and predictability of the shock while bringing forward the wide scope of actions. 
The household’s responses to risk are so varied that it is natural to ask whether real holes remain in 
the effective market structure. The emerging consensus is that holes in ineffective insurance and 
credit markets exist, especially for the poorest households. But in general, the holes are a good deal 
smaller that many had assumed (Morduch, 1995). This consensus establishes a bridge between 
supply and demand determinants, i.e. between market and household constraints. Households 
operating at near-subsistence income levels may strengthen the motive for consumption and 
income smoothing more than anyone else since the consequences of a bad income in a given year - 
both in terms of sensitivity and resilience - would be catastrophic under such circumstances. If 
market imperfections limit the possibilities for consumption and income smoothing, poverty 
restricts even further as it controls the household’s ability by influencing market access, 
household’s assets base and comparative advantage, access to high-return activities, the link 
between consumption and income activities, etc.
10.  
 
Either case – supply or demand determinants -, the Risk Management approach emphasizes the risk 
outcomes, over other elements of households’ vulnerability, i.e. risk events and households 
                                                            
9 Research on the influence of the intensity of risk events on consumption smoothing has been mostly 
focused on its repetitive nature (e.g. Morduch, 1995; Deaton, 1992, 1997; Alderman, 1996; Webb and 
Reardon, 1992; Devereux, 1999).  
10 A great part of this literature explores savings behaviour through the interlinakges between consumption, 
income, liquidity constraints and production. Empirical accounts of buffer stock behaviour with liquidity 
constraints see Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993), Udry (1995), Alderman (1996), Fafchamps et al. (1998), De 
Waal (1989), Paxson (1992). On the relationship between income smoothing and household’s assets base see 
Dercon (1996, 2000), Jacoby and Skoufias (1997), Jalal and Ravallion (1998).   9
responses
11.   And leaving the risk events on a secondary position, integrated into the analysis only 
by its characteristics of spread, intensity and predictability, the risk outcomes has been restrictively 
addressed, mostly as a purely economic failure, associated with household’s assets.  We could say 
that there are two interconnected reasons that may explain why the nature of the risk event lies on 
the periphery and consequently why the standard framework of risk management is not suitable to 
context of armed conflict.  
 
The first reason of concern is about the lack of information on risk events as it is difficult to collect 
and therefore scarce. This lack of available information has led researchers to proxy shocks by 
factors other than their causes. Risk events are often proxied by residuals obtained from actual 
income and some measure of permanent income (e.g. Kochar, 1995; Jalal Ravallion, 1998); and 
also from the variability of change of impact indicators (coefficient of variation on the impact 
variables) such as earnings, income, assets, returns to labour, yields per unit of land, prices, labour, 
etc. (e.g. Townsend, 1994, 1995; Kinsey et al., 1998
)). At other times, when information is 
available, the shocks are proxied either by year and location dummies that estimate the distribution 
of village level shocks, differentiating between bad and good years, or by the shocks themselves, 
crop failure, rainfall variability, etc. (e.g. Dercon and Krishnan, 2000; Paxson, 1992). However, 
even in these cases where there is detailed information about the shocks, the analysis does not distil 
information about the cause-related issues households care about when they are exposed to a 
particular risk event. It is rare that the nature of the shock is unpacked. This leads us to the second 
explanation. 
 
The second reason explaining the lack of relevance of the nature of the risk events has to do with a 
general portrayal of risk events as exogenous (Duffield, 1994).  This assumption comes from the 
general perception that while the causes of the risk are beyond human influence, their effects, i.e. 
the outcomes, can be influenced.  
 
The explanation of exogeneity was first implicitly raised by Sen (1981) in his understanding of 
famine in Ethiopia. As the determinants of the household’s entitlements are only confined to 
economic factors (ownership of tangible assets and the exchange rate), risk events are implicitly 
considered exogenous and exposure to risk events is generic across households, while relative 
poverty is the effective variable that would explain the differential household vulnerability across 
                                                            
11 Alwang et al. (2001) review the different approaches to vulnerability explaining the differences through 
their focus, whether it is on the risk events, strategies and outcomes. While environmentalists (including 
those concerned with disaster management), sociologists and health practitioners focus on the outcomes, 
within the field of economics, the Asset and the Food Security approaches focus mostly on the responses 
(e.g. Swift, 1989; Moser , 1998; Devereux, 1992); and the Poverty Dynamics and Risk Management centre 
on the outcomes (e.g. Baulch and Hoddinott, 2000; Deaton, 1996; Paxson 1992).  
   10
households and community groups (Deng, 2004). By saying that vulnerability to famine is the 
result of relative poverty and/or failure of households to use their ability to avoid it, Sen favours a 
restrictive view of famine as an economic disaster (Devereux, 2001; De Waal 1990) that imputes 
the root causes of vulnerability to poverty and market forces (Keen, 1994).  
 
Influenced by Sen, the different approaches to risk management explaining the phenomenon of 
survival during crises neglect the issue of power, as they consider only the victims of famine, and 
focus mostly on assets. Sen’s exclusion of risk events has been questioned. Watts (1991) argues 
that this omission is a deliberate way of avoiding engagement with the highly politicised context 
within which famines invariable occur. However, Devereux (2001) further notes that the 
Entitlement approach seeks to analyse how famines happen rather than why they happen; and this 
focus could explain why Sen excludes the main characteristics of civil war from the Entitlement 
approach. Indeed, although the general proposition states that a person starves either because the 
person does not have the ability to command enough food or because the person does not uses 
his/her ability to avoid starvation, Sen’s approach focuses analysis on the former.  
 
The Complex Emergency (CE) approach questions the portrayal of risk events, such as those 
encountered during armed conflicts, as exogenous by studying their characteristics in detail. Just as 
natural disasters, they damage social services, market networks and agricultural enterprises while at 
the same time they increase the demand for the essential services such features normally provide. 
Unlike natural disasters, however, armed conflicts systematically and deliberately violate 
individual and group rights to reproduce and secure an adequate livelihood, by eroding and 
destroying the political, economic, social and environmental systems as well as blocking and 
manipulating coping strategies. Thus, one of the most important and unique characteristics of the 
phenomenon is its deliberate threat to self-sufficiency (Duffield, 1994; De Waal, 1990; Keen, 
1994).  
 
Furthermore, CE approach contributed enormously to the unravelling of important characteristics 
of armed conflict. The nature of armed conflicts is multi-dimensional, setting up complex and 
multi-layered systems in which different conflicts interact with one another (Duffield, 1994). They 
have a double-time dimension. While they produce structural changes embedding the society and 
therefore the on-going economic, social and political processes, they are not static but in 
continuous transformation (Cliffe and Luckham, 2000). Conflict does not occur linearly, where 
conflict and peace represent opposite ends of a continuum, but rather coexist in different degrees of 
intensity and it rarely occurs a one-off shock and shocks may often result from the slower structural 
processes of social disintegration (Keen, 1998). 
   11
An interest in the characteristics of conflict-produced shocks has recently appeared among those 
studying the impact. Comparing to other type of shocks, war-produced shocks tend to have a more 
destructive and wider impact as it affects human, natural, economic and physical assets influencing 
substantially the recovery period (Justino, 2007; Bodea and Elbadawi, 2008). Nillesen and 
Verwimp (2010b) in their discussion about the effects of violent conflict on household preferences 
and portfolio choice bring forward distinctive features of conflict-produced shocks. According to 
them war shocks can not be treated as natural disasters or health related risk events because they 
last longer (e.g. Fearon, 2004), may reoccur (e.g. Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom, 2004) and install 
fear and anger in the affected population (e.g.Al Sarraj, 2003; Fearon and Laitin, 2003).  
 
As it will be discussed in the results sections, little by little, efforts are being made by scholars and 
practitioners to unpack the intrinsic and unique characteristics of political crises such as armed 
conflict and extend it to the micro level in order to explain how these-above mentioned features 
unfold and are responded by the households. This is also the challenge of this research. Once we 
know that the risk management framework is not suitable to context of armed conflict because 
conflict-produced shocks are endogenous, dynamic and multidimensional, then we need to identify 
the micro-implications of the CE approach into the household’s risk-related behaviour.  
Based on the recent literature and the results of this research, this research believes that in the same 
manner that the risk management framework was adapted to context of developing countries, 
where there is uncertainty and markets are imperfect, another adaptation is required that integrates 
the characteristics of conflict-produced shocks.  
 
Before the results of the empirical analysis are presented, the following section presents the study 
framework.  
 
3. The Study Framework: the Case Study, Research Methods and Data. 
 
Being the purpose of this research to place risk at the centre of the analysis, the understanding and 
operationalization of the conflict has received particular attention. In this manner, this section 
presents in detail the case study, the West Bank during the Al-Aqsa Intifada, and the data 
illustrating the conflict-produced shocks during the period 2000-2004.  
 
3.1 The West Bank during the II Intifada 
 
This research is set in the West Bank during the period 2000-2004, the years immediately 
following the onset of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000. Rather than exploring the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict during these years, this investigation focuses on one of its four dimensions: the   12
Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories
12. Given the different realities of the tree territories 
comprising the oPt – the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and Jerusalem – this research focuses solely on 
the situation of the West Bank.  
 
As Article 42 of the Hague Regulations stipulates, a ‘territory is considered occupied when it is 
actually placed under the authority of the hostile army’, and that the occupation extends ‘to the 
territory when such authority has been established and can be exercised’
13. Furthermore, the 
Tribunal of the Nuremberg trial in the Hostage Case
14 detailed that a territory is occupied even 
when the occupying forces had partially evacuated certain parts of the territory or lost control over 
the population, as long as it could at any point in time re-assume physical control of that territory. 
This puts forward the notion that the definition of a legal regime of occupation is not whether the 
occupying power exercises effective control over the territory, but whether it has the ability to do 
so at any point in time.  
 
One way to illustrate the occupation is by the system of control which Israel has set out since the 
beginning of the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967. To meet this end, its 
military authorities had by 2004 issued over 2500 military orders altering pre-existing laws 
regulating all aspects of the daily life in the oPt (Al Haq, 2005). Passed by the Area Commander of 
the Israeli military forces, who assumed all legislative, executive and judicial powers, they 
effectively extended military jurisdiction over the oPt, and continued to apply this following the 
signing of the Oslo Interim Agreements. The net effect has been the consolidation of Israeli 
juridical control over the oPt by creating two systems of legal bodies - one applying to Israeli Jews, 
and the other to native Palestinians - with a gradual transformation of zoning laws, regional 
planning and the transfer of land acquisition to the benefit of the former national group, and to the 
detriment of the latter (Heiberg and Øvensen, 1997).  
 
The consolidation of Israel juridical control over the oPt during the period 1967-1988 has been 
summarized by Raja Shehadeh in his book Occupier’s Law (1989). Four legislative stages are 
outlined. In the first stage (1967-1971) the military government established its control over 
transactions of immovable property, the use of water and other natural resources, the power to 
                                                            
12 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict contains four main questions or axes (e.g. Roy, 2007; Escudero, 2006): i) 
the refugee issue and the right of return created by the 1948 and 1967 wars and the subsequent Israeli 
occupation of the Palestinian territories (Mardam-Bey and Sanbar, 2004); ii) the situation of the Palestinians 
of Israel, those that stayed within the limits of the 1948-created state of Israel (Bishara, 2001); the status of 
the city of Jerusalem, one of the most extreme points of friction between Israelis and Palestinians (Tamari, 
2003); and the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories, which started in 1967 during the Six-Day war 
(Shehade, 1989).  
13 Regulations Annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
of 1907 (Hague Regulations).  
14 The Hostage Case is the name given to the case number 7 of the Nuremberg Proceedings on May 10, 1947.   13
expropriate land, the authority to operate banks and over the regulation of municipal and village 
councils. In this period also the system of control over the movement of individuals was established 
(identity cards, travel permits, driving licenses and licenses for professional practices). The 
following years from 1971-1979 were primarily aimed at the transfer of Arab lands to the control 
of Jewish settlement councils. This involved amending Jordanian land laws to facilitate zoning 
‘public’ lands to the benefit of Israeli bodies and for acquisition of local land by ‘foreign’ 
companies. The third phase (1979-1981) involved the transfer of authority and power from the 
Israeli Military Government to the newly established Israeli Civil Administration, and the 
extension of Israeli law to apply to Jewish settlers so that they would not be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the West Bank and Gaza courts. The last phase highlighted by Shehadeh is the 
decade of the 1980s, which marked the consolidation of Israeli control over expropriated land, 
which in 1991 constituted more than 60% of the total area of the oPt. Besides, in this period 
military orders were issued to regulate fiscal policy governing the oPt, particularly those pertaining 
to the collection of taxes and revenues, and of the flow of funds to the territories. 
 
The decade of the 1990s was greatly shaped by the end of the first Intifada and the Oslo Peace 
Process. The Oslo Accords provided a framework for transferring powers and responsibilities to the 
Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and for Israel redeployment from the Gaza Strip and the 
West Bank. However, as no final settlement was agreed, the geographical demarcation agreed in 
the interim agreement as a transitory measure remained permanent resulting in the oPt as a sum of 
non-contiguous Palestinian areas surrounded by a contiguous area under Israel Authority
15. 
Furthermore, Israel, regardless of whether or not it has transferred specific parts of the territory to 
Palestinian self-rule, retained control over foreign relations, external security, security for Israelis 
(including settlers in the oPt), and territorial jurisdiction over military installations, Israeli 
settlements and East Jerusalem, which enabled to remain an occupant.  
 
In September 2000, clashes exploded at Al-Aqsa Mosque in occupied East Jerusalem between 
Israeli forces and Palestinian worshippers angered by the visit made by the then opposition leader 
Ariel Sharon and Israeli forces to the Al-Sharif compound. This event proves to be the opening 
sequence in the largest sustained Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation. This crisis, far 
from representing a break with the recent past, is a logical and inevitable extension of it. The Al-
                                                            
15 See Map 2 for an ilustration of the geographical demarcation in the West Bank. By virtue of this 
agreement, the oPt were divided into three areas, A, B and C. Area A, comprising 17% of the oPt, is where 
the PNA established central political institutions and was empowered to provide socio-economic services as 
well as a security infrastructure, internal security, public order, and the administration of the specific civil 
spheres. Area B, containing 24% of the territory, is under Palestinian civil control and Israeli security control 
and comprises the majority of the Palestinian rural communities. Finally Area C – around 60% – is under full 
Israel control, except over Palestinian civilians (Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements, September 13, 1993; Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 24-28 
September, 1995).   14
Aqsa Intifada did not emerge in a vacuum but emanated from the context that characterized the 
entire Oslo Peace Process and its impact on Palestinians. The Oslo Peace Process was neither an 
instrument of decolonization nor a mechanism to apply international legitimacy to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. Instead, it is framework that has accentuated a skewed balance of power and 
has created a dysfunctional environment for negotiations
16. By the year 2000, after seven years of 
the Oslo process, more than five years after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, and 
considerable external assistance - valued at approximately $ 3 billion between 1994 and the third 
quarter of 2000 (Le More, 2008) – living standards were lower than before the process began with 
per capita income levels in the oPt were estimated to be about 10% below their pre-Oslo level  
(Erickson, 2001). 
 
During the period of the II Intifada, the Israeli occupation has been characterised by the territorial, 
socio-economic and political fragmentation produced by the Israeli policy of closure, the use of 
violence by the Israel Defence Forces, and the construction of the Wall. The following OCHA map 
illustrates the West Bank in 2004. 
                                                            
16 Assessments about the Oslo Peace process and its consequences can be found for example in Keating et al. 
(2005), Álvarez-Ossorio (2003), Roy (2001a), Rabbani (2001) and Pacheco (2001).    15
 







As it can be observed from the map, East Jerusalem and the West Bank has become a collection of 
isolated areas and enclaves separated from one another. The fragmentation stands in sharp 
contradiction to the sine qua non of territorial contiguity as the basis for an economically and 
politically viable state and has catastrophic socio-economic consequences
17. The following table 
contains some of the output indicators for the period 1999-2004.  
Table 1: Socio-economic indicators  
  1999 2000  2001  2002  2003 2004 
           
GDP real per capita change in the oPt (accumulated from 
1999) 
 9.6  -26.5  -37.3  -36.8  -38 
Budget deficit (in percentage)   6          8.6 
Trade balance (% GDP)  -63.6  -55.4  -43.3  -61.1  -53  -64.4 
Total PNA trade with Israel/total PNA trade (%)  67.1  71.12  78.6  53.4  75.1  66.8 
Population (in millions)   3.08  3.12 3.33 3.45 3.73 3.637 
In the West Bank  1.97  2.04 2.12 2.19  2.367 2.33 
In the Gaza Strip  1.12  1.16 1.21 1.26 1.37 1.37 
Total employment (thousand)  588  597  508  486  591  607 
In public sector  103  115  122  125  128  131 
In Israel and Settlements  127  110  66  47  53  48 
Unemployment rate (% of labour force) 21.7  24.6  36.2  41.2  33.4  32.6 
% Households under poverty (2.1$ per person per day)   20  27  37  51  47  48 
Sources: PCBS. The Poverty data are World Bank estimations 
                                                            
17 UNCTAD (2006), FAO (2003, 2007), UNSCO (2005), Sletten and Pederson (2003), World Bank (2002, 
2003a,2003b, 2004a, 2004b), OCHA (2007), OCHA and UNRWA (2003, 2004, 2005) and FAO (2003, 
2006).   16
 
Since 2000 the situation has aggravated deep-seated structural weaknesses and vulnerability to 
external shocks arising from prolonged occupation, foreign aid disbursements and mismanagement 
of the PNA, as manifested by volatile economic growth, persistent, high unemployment rates and 
chronic internal and external imbalances. The PNA, disposed of critical economic resources or 
factors of production needed to create and sustain productive capacity, have created extreme 
dependency on employment in Israel and overall on the foreign aid as a source of Gross National 
Product growth (UNCTAD, 2006); and restricted the kind of indigenous institutional development, 
it failed to lead structural reform that is economic, social, and political (Roy, 2001a). 
 
Against all odds, the Palestinian economy continues to function and defies the devastating 
conditions of those four years. Three main factors explain why the economy and society as a whole 
was able to withstand such conditions (UNCTAD, 2006; World Bank, 2004b): the reliance and 
cohesiveness of Palestinian society and the informal safety nets and innovative responses 
developed by enterprises; the ability of the Palestinian Authority to continue functioning and 
employing at least 30 per cent of those who are currently in work; and the increase in 
disbursements of donor support for budgetary solvency, relief and development efforts. However, 
continuing defying the Israeli occupation has a price to pay: the profound decline of living 
conditions. Household expenditure has decreased dramatically; since 1999 food consumption has 
fallen by around one third
18; poverty doubled, reaching almost 50% of the population and 16% 
under severe poverty (less than 1.6 US$ per person per day) (World Bank, 2004b). Human capital 
has been particularly hit. Over one million students and over 44,000 teachers in 2000 schools were 
affected by movement restrictions (PCBS, 2005b); 50% of households reported difficulties in 
accessing health care and the number of mental health patients receiving treatment at community 
health centres increased by 39% within the period 2000-2004 (OCHA, 2005a).   
 
3.2. Data and Research Methods 
 
The empirical research was conceived as an informal collaborative investigation with key 
stakeholders engaged with the use of risk management strategies as indicators of vulnerability. The 
objective was not only to collect data but most importantly to do research as a reflective process 
linked to development practice and policy-making. In order to do so, a great part of the research 
was carried out in the oPt. During the 12 months of the fieldwork, discussions with key 
stakeholders were held to check the relevance of the hypothesis, availability of data and 
                                                            
18 According to the FAO Food Security Assessment carried out in 2003, 40% of the oPt Palestinians was 
food insecure and another 30% was under threat of becoming food insecure (FAO, 2003).   17
possibilities for partnerships
19. Collaborative action-research proposals were presented to the 
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
20 (PCBS) and the United Nations Food Agriculture 
Organization
21 (FAO), both working in the micro-analysis of risk management during the period 
2000-2004.  
 
In order to study how the specific characteristics of conflicts unfold into the risk management, the 
empirical analysis counts on primary and secondary data. Concerning the primary data, informant 
individual- and group-based interviews
22 were carried out to explore Palestinians’ perceptions on 
the risk events (sources, objectives, causes) and their response mechanisms (actions and 
motivations). Far from drawing national inferences or making representative statements
23, the 
interviews aimed at exploring the risk management strategies beyond the household surveys, whose 
questions related to risk management seemed to have been imported from contexts of natural 
disasters and economic crises.  
 
Secondary data, such as the Palestinian Expenditure and Consumption Survey (PECS) and a 
conflict database, were used to explore the characteristics of the conflict-produced shocks, their 
relationships with risk management strategies and risk management profiles.  
 
Since 1996 and approximately on a yearly basis, the PECS provide information about the standards 
of living and patterns of consumption and expenditure among Palestinian households in the oPt. 
For the purpose of this research, the PECS for 2004 is used
24. It contains information about risk 
management strategies and others socio-economic characteristics collected during 2004 for a 
sample of 3,098 private households, whose usual residence is the oPt. Based on a stratified cluster 
systematic random sample, the survey has been stratified by region, governorate and type of 
locality (rural, urban, refugee camp). Besides these geographical levels, the village of residence of 
the household was made available for the purpose of this research. The availability of the village is 
                                                            
19 See Appendix 1 for details on the consultations.  
20 The PCBS is an independent body within the PNA and is responsible for the Palestinian household surveys 
such as the Palestinian Expenditure and Consumption Survey (PECS), Palestinian Census, the Palestinian 
Labour Force Survey (LFS), as well as other relevant surveys monitoring the impact of the Israeli measures 
following the onset of the second Intifada. 
21 FAO carries out the Palestinian food security assessments (FSA). At the time of the field work, it was 
preparing the questionnaire for the 2006 FSA. 
22 See Appendix 1 for details on the interviews. 
23 The selection of the interviewees did not aim to be representative either geographically or in terms of 
household socio-economic characteristics. Given the movement restrictions within the West Bank, the 
interviewees were selected based on accesibility. The sensitivity of the questions in terms of household 
finance and position towards Israel, required an atmosphere of confidence and trust, which also influenced 
the selection process. 
24 It is to be noted that the different PECS rounds lack an homogenous questionnaire (PECS 2004 is the only 
round containing risk management data) and a common stratification level. Most of the studies rely on 1998 
and 2004 rounds, see for example World Bank (2004a, 2004b), UNSCO (2005), FAO (2006), UNCTAD 
(2006), Astrup and Dessus (2001).   18
of particular relevance for this research as it is the furthest geographical unit, where both household 
and conflict data converge.  
 
The conflict data includes conflict-produced shocks illustrating the different dimensions of the 
Israeli occupation at the governorate and village level during the period 2000-2004. With the 
overall aim to understand the occupation and its time- and location-specific dimensions, historical 
and current accounts were revisited in order to operationalize the occupation into a data set. The 
starting point was the survey ‘Livelihoods, Shocks and Coping Strategies of World Foof 
Programme (WFP) beneficiaries in the oPt’ which provided information about the shocks 
households suffered in 2004. 
 
Table2: Risk events in the West Bank 
Type of risk  Affected households  
(In percentage) 
The Wall & security zones 
Israel army incursions 
Limited access to land, work and markets 
Curfew 
Illness 











Source: World Food Programme   
 
The shock that affects the most is this produced by the Wall. In June 2002, the Government of 
Israel began the construction of the Wall
25. In October 2005, it was declared that 75% of the length 
of the Wall (constructed and projected) is inside the West Bank territory; 10% of the West Bank 
land (including Jerusalem) had been either confiscated for the construction of the Wall or was 
trapped between the Wall and the Green Line, the so-called ‘seamed zone’; 15 Palestinian 
communities were enclosed in these zones, physically separated by the Wall from the rest of the 
West Bank
26. The Wall isolated the land, water resources and basic services of a far greater number 
                                                            
25The Wall is a complex series of of ditches, trenches, roads, razor wire, electronic fences and concrete walls 
within the West Bank. In areas where the Wall has been constructed, military orders are issued creating a 
new strip averaging 150-200 metres on the West Bank sides of the Wall, where new construction is 
prohibited (OCHA and UNRWA, 2004). See Map 4 for the status of the Wall construction in December 
2003. 
26 Humanitarian Impact of Barrier Updates have been carried out by OCHA and UNRWA since 2003 
following a request of the Humanitarian Emergency Policy Group (HEPG) comprising the European 
Commission. the European Union (EU) President, the World Bank, United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), Norway and United Nations Special Coordinator Office for the Middle East 
(UNSCO).   19




As regards the Israeli army incursions, since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the Israel 
Defence Forces (IDF) have been redeployed in the West Bank. The violence reached its peak in 
2002, when IDF reoccupied the main cities, towns and some villages in the West Bank and 
imposed twenty-four hour curfews on their populations. During the period 2000-2004, the villages 
of the West Bank underwent an average of 1142 hours under curfew
28.  Figures for casualties and 
other losses often vary widely from source to source and sometimes from report to report issued by 
a single organization. These discrepancies have been illustrated by Esposito (2005). He examined a 
wide range of sources such as human rights organizations, the IDF, the PNA and the United 
Nations (UN).  The following is an extract of the table compiled by Esposito.  
 





3 IDF PNA  PRCS
4  UN
 
Palestinians              
Killed  3,022 3,470  3,572  3,880   3,437 
Injured   27,600  53,000    42,345  27,770  33,770 
Permanently 
disabled 
   2,500         
In detention  7,366  8,000  8,000         
Israelis              
Killed 919    1,008      942   
Injured     1,008  989    6,008  5,961 
Physical Damage              
Houses destroyed  3,700  542  720         
Houses and public 
Buildings 
damaged 
    11,553   7,633   2,751 
Trees uprooted          1,252,537     
1. Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights; 2. Palestinian NGO for human rights; 3. Palestinian 
Health Development Information Project; 4. Palestinian Red Crescent Society.  
 
Finally, the third mentioned shock refers to the access limitations mostly related to the policy of 
closure, the Wall and the Israeli infrastructure in the West Bank. In its most descriptive and sterile 
way, closure is a recently-coined term referring to the policy of physical barriers and permit 
requirements used to control the movement of Palestinian goods and persons across borders - 
between the oPt and third countries and between the oPt and Israel  – and within the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip. Although Israel has controlled Palestinian movement since the occupation of the 
                                                            
27 Out of the 63 Wall gates in September 2004, 23 are open for Palestinian use. The permits requirements and 
opening time depend on the type of gate (agricultural, road, school, seasonal, settlements or checkpoint). For 
example, agricultural gates allow access to agricultural fields, green houses and orchards located on the 
opposing side of the Wall. Farmers must obtain a green permit to cross the gate to their fields. Opening times 
depend on the specific gate but in many instances they are open three times a day for an hour or an hour-and-
a-half. Another example are the school gates, whose opening coincide with school hours twice daily and they 
are only open to children and teachers (OCHA and UNRWA, 2004).  
28 Curfew data has been obtained from UNRWA and OCHA data bases.    20
Palestinian Territories started in 1967, it was just in 1991 when a restrictive system of control was 
introduced and enforced through personal permits and checkpoints placed along the Green Line. 
During the 1990s, the policy of closure was consolidated due to the division of the territory into 
zones of Palestinian and Israeli control as demarcated during the interim period of the Oslo 
Accords (Roy, 2001b). Most of its implementation took place in the course of the second Intifada. 
Within a period of 20 years the closure policy passed from a set of entry and exit restrictions into 
Israel, any other third countries as well as between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (external 
closure) to a sophisticated system of permits, roads and physical obstacles (internal closure) that 
limit and control the movement of goods and people within the West Bank (World Bank, 2002).  
 
In October 2004, there were in the West Bank approximately 60 checkpoints and more than 460 
physical obstacles such as roadblocks, road-gates, earth-mounds, roadblocks and trenches
29. Nearly 
all of these obstacles are located along the roads primarily reserved for Israeli use to connect the 
settlements, military areas and other infrastructure
30 in the West Bank, as well as with Israel. 
Palestinians require a permit or are compelled to use an alternative road network of secondary and 
more circuitous roads.  In July 2004 just 1% of the West Bank Palestinians and 7% of the licensed 
cars hold the ‘Special Movement Permit at Internal Checkpoints in Judea and Samaria’ and during 
the first four years of the Intifada, the permits to work in Israel and in the settlements decreased by 
59% in the West Bank (Lein, 2001).  The impact of the restrictions of movement, as we have 
previously described, are profound, as the roads and other obstacles have created isolated 
Palestinian enclaves fragmenting the entire livelihoods
31.  
 
In order to look for data capturing the shocks produced by the army incursions, the Wall and the 
movement restrictions, we rely on secondary sources from Palestinian, international and Israeli 
organizations which have carefully monitored the occupation within the context of the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict. The following table contains the data illustrating the three dimensions – use of 
violence, land annexation and movement restrictions - of the Israeli-occupation during the period 
2000-2004.  
                                                            
29 OCHA Movement and Access Report and Weekly Briefing Notes monitor on a monthly and weekly basis 
respectively the movement restrictions in the oPt. See Map 5 for an illustration of the closure policy. 
30 According to OCHA satellite and field work analysis, in 2005 there are 450,000 settlers living in 145 
settlements in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) occupying 16,375 hectares (40% of the West Bank’s 
land and 20% of the West Bank population) (OCHA, 2007). See Map 3 for an illustration of the Israelis 
structures in the West Bank. Recent accounts of the evolution of the settlements can be found in Etkes and 
Ofran (2005), Lein (2002) and OCHA (2007).  
31 For a review of the impact of closure on Palestinian livelihoods see for example, UNSCO (2005), OCHA 
(2005b), Al-Haq (2005), Roy (2001b), Aranki (2004), Brown (2004), Lein (2001) and Bornstein (2001).   21
 
 
The operationalization of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank during 2000-2004 is one of the 
value added of this research as it brings forward the risk events by illustrating its characteristics in 
a comprehensive and specific (time and location) manner. Unlike in other conflict areas, the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is a well-documented reality. Governmental institutions, Non-governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) and international organizations continually monitor its progress, producing 
a myriad of data. Since the micro-analysis of conflict is highly constrained by the lack of data 
(Justino, 2007), the availability of data about the Israeli-Palestinian situation offers a great 
opportunity to understand more about the understanding of conflict and the behaviour of 
households in such contexts.  
Table 4:  Data proxing the occupation during 2000-2004  
 Data  Source  Time  coverage  Unit of 
analysis 
 

















No. Palestinians killed  B’Tselem  From October 2000   Village  
PRSC  From September 2000   Governorate 
No. Palestinians injured  PRSC  From October 2000   Governorate 
No. Hours under curfew  OCHA  From October 2003  Village 
UNRWA  From July 2002   Village 



















  No. Of settlements  PCBS  1967 – 2005  Governorate 
Settlements, built-up areas & municipal 
boundaries 









Amount of confiscated land  OCHA  From October 2003   Village 
Amount of confiscated land for the  
construction of the Wall 
PCBS  August 2003 & March 2004  Governorate 
 





June 2002 – December 2004 
 
Village 


























No. Of checkpoints  & roadblocks per 
governorate 
OCHA  2000, December 2003, 
January 2004, March 2004, 
July 2004, November 2004 
Governorate 
Index of village closure
1  Own 
construction  
December 2003, January 
2004, March 2004, July 





2   Own 
construction  
June 2002 – December 2004  Villages 
included in 
PECS 
1. Based on OCHA maps, it measures the degree of proximity between the village and its natural centre (assumed as the 
closest community with a hospital) and ranks the degree of movement restrictions between 0 and 5 depending on the 
type of obstacle (manned- or unmanned-operated) and the type of road where the obstacle is located (main or 
secondary). See Appendix 2 for details on its construction. 
2. Based on OCHA maps it describes how much the Wall encloses the village, specifically how many village sides 
(ranging from 0 to 4) are within 1km of the Wall.    22
 
4.   The Results: the Risk Management of Households in Conflict 
 
The results present the micro-implications of the CE approach into household risk behaviour, 
specifically how the characteristics of armed conflict unfold into the risk management. By 
analysing the case study of West Bank during 2000-2004, the research identifies some of the 
distinctive features and elements of risk management in contexts of armed conflict.  
 
The first micro-implication is a general one and emerges from the study of the risk-management 
framework for developing countries and the literature on the causes, effects and characteristics of 
armed conflicts. Thus, the research argues that risk events need to be placed at the centre of the 
analysis of risk management of households living in armed conflicts. If the assumption of risk 
events as exogenous has allowed labelling risk in a generic manner, focusing on the characteristics 
of spread, intensity and predictability, and putting the risk events on a secondary level, then 
assuming them as endogenous has the reverse effect, which is to place them at the centre of the risk 
management process. This means that risk events, household responses, and the determinants and 
outcomes of risk management need to be studied within the context of their causes.  
 
4.1  The Risk Events 
 
As we have mentioned, because of a lack of information or the assumption of exogeneity, the 
impact of the risk event captured most of the attention and the study of the nature of the risk event 
was often restricted to the study of its unpredictability, spread and intensity.  However, in context 
of armed conflict the risk events need to be studied within their causes and this requires to move 
beyond these characteristics and integrate its nature in holistic manner. This means that risk events 
also need to be understood by their specific source (use of violence, asset looting, movement 
restrictions, economic embargoes, etc.) and the nature of the conflict (ethnic cleansing, economic 
subjugation, land occupation, etc.) as well as by its intrinsic features as highlighted by the CE 
approach (multidimensional, endogenous and dynamic). 
 
These features that describes the risk event nature are relevant for the risk management process. 
They contain information about the breath of exposure, the intensity of the impact as well as the 
capacity and possibilities to deal with its consequences. Besides it contains information the 
households care about when managing the risk - such as the possible timing, the avoidance margin, 
the competing set of objectives to trade-off, the options available, the conflict overall objectives 
and rationale, etc. However, beyond a general account of the importance of risk nature, its effects 
into household vulnerability and household risk management are not explicitly approached in the   23
emerging literature on risk management of households in conflict. If it is true that the causes are 




In the analysis of risk management there is a tendency to use the magnitude of the shock as catch-
all term describing the intensity of conflict; and other intensity variables such as the spread, 
frequency and duration are yet to receive much attention
32. Thus, the magnitude of conflict-
produced shocks illustrated by continuous or dummy variables representing a particular risk event 
(e.g. death, house damage, detainment, displacement, movement restrictions, etc.), is used to 
indicate the extent of the absence or presence of armed conflict (e.g. Bundervoet, 2007; 
Shemyakina, 2006). While there is a growing tendency to illustrating the direct effects of armed 
conflict by a set of variables (e.g. Verpoorten, 2007; Chamarbagwala and Moran, 2008; Voors et 
al., 2010), it is common to find conflict simplified into one unique factor. Violence is the 
instrument of war, which is most often illustrated (e.g. Rodríguez and Sánchez, 2009; Brück et al., 
2010b; Bozzoli et al., 2010). In fact, proxying conflict by the intensity of violence - high, medium 
or low depending on the number of casualties - is in line with one of the most common ways of 
categorizing conflict. While this could be enough to explain certain armed conflicts or certain 
periods of an armed conflict, it can be a misleading simplification for others such as the Israeli 
occupation of the oPt.  
 
The analysis across time and across occupation variables illustrate that the intensity of the conflict 
is reflected by multiple shocks, which do not necessarily behave similarly across time and whose 
simplification into one single shock could cause a loss of information
33. While the conflict was 
characterised by intense violence during the period 2000-2002, it was mostly shaped by movement 
restrictions and land annexation during 2003-2004. Thus, if we focus on this last period, the 
dimensions of the conflict gaining relevance were not so much related to violence but to space and 
land. Despite the low violence the conflict was in a process of intensification due to the Israeli 
policy of closure and the construction of the Wall.  
 
Double Time Dimension 
                                                            
32 The longer the period of conflict, the more likely it becomes that households liquidate their productive 
assets, abandon them to become refugees, etc (see ODI Livelihoods and Chronic Conflict Working Papers 
Series). However, a short war can also strongly affect household welfare, especially if the conflict-produced 
shocks (e.g. violence, asset looting or displacement) are frequent, intense, widespread and if the households 
were already vulnerable at the outset of the conflict (e.g. Stewart; 1997; Justino, 2007).  
33 See Appendix 3.    24
The second nature-related aspect of the conflict-produced shocks is about its duration and the 
double time dimension it may contain, where temporal and structural changes cohabit. If the start 
of the conflict introduces a long-term widespread structural change in the fundamental structure of 
the economy and society, unremitting shocks of a variable nature bring about micro-scale or short-
term outcomes that cannot be disregarded. Thus, in this sense the concern is not so much about 
whether chronic conflicts can be treated as shocks but how to differentiate between temporary 
shocks and structural changes. 
 
The double time dimension of conflict can be observed in the oPt through the policy of closure and 
the Wall. On the one hand, the policy of closure introduces structural change into the economy and 
in society due to the fragmentation of the territory and the subsequent breaking down of the 
relationship with Israel and between West Bank districts and between rural and urban communities. 
For example, there has been a change in the nature of employment. As regards the private sector, 
compared to pre-intifada levels, by 2004, 16% of pre-2000 services and industrial sector enterprises 
and 14% of construction and internal trade companies had permanently closed (PCBS, 2004b). 
Major sources of employment have been shifting to the agriculture and services sectors including 
the PNA institutions
34. There has been an increase in the proportion of part-time jobs, in 
governmental jobs, in family business and self-employment, mostly in subsistence agriculture and 
in the trade sector, where incomes are low and intermittent (World Bank, 2004a). The location of 
employment has changed from cities to towns or villages in order to reduce the cost and the 
probabilities of movement restrictions (UNSCO, 2005). 
 
On the other hand, the policy of closure and the Wall have also a dynamic nature, which cannot be 
disregarded.  Palestinian livelihoods are affected by short-term shocks produced by the continuous 
changes in the instruments and procedures of the policies of movement restriction or land 
annexation. For example, when there are changes in the requirements for holding a permit, in the 
type of physical obstacle blocking the road, in the opening hours of Wall gates, etc. These changes 
introduce physical and administrative shocks, which accompanied by the absence of law or its 
arbitrary application are characteristics of a system of control that permeates the tempo of daily life 
affecting every single aspect of the individual and collective livelihoods of a wide range of the 
population. At the individual level, it creates a sense of powerlessness; at the family level, it 
obstructs the ability of households to chart a purposeful existence for their members; and at the 
community and national levels, it prevents systematic planning for the future.  
 
                                                            
34 Compared to pre-Intifada levels, in 2004 there were 67% less Palestinians working in Israel or Israeli 
settlements. Employment shocks were partially absorbed by the Palestinian domestic economy, which 
created approximately 30,000 new jobs (UNCTAD, 2006).   25
The importance of uncertainty in context of armed conflict have been brought up by macro-level 
studies focusing on the links between conflict and development. Stewart (1997) observed that an 
increase in uncertainty is one of the causal factors that explain the two-way causality between 
conflict and low-income countries. At the micro level, it is an area rarely addressed and hence more 
research is encouraged. One of the most important contributions is the work of Bundervoet (2007) 
and Verpoorten (2007), who use uncertainty to address the endogenous nature of conflict-produced 
shocks. They argued that while the model of consumption under liquidity constraints developed by 
Deaton (1991), the so-called buffer-stock model, focuses all the uncertainty on income, in the 
context of conflict, savings (both liquid and physical) are also affected because of looting and 
destruction of assets.  
 
Endogenous Nature 
In an attempt to understand the causes of uncertainty and more generally, the endogenous nature 
and rationale of the occupation-produced shocks in the West Bank, we have analysed how the 
different shocks interact and have asked the Palestinians about their own perceptions about 
occupation-produced shocks. 
 
As regards the risk events interactions, the correlation analysis showed a couple of interesting 
relationships, which are worth noting and encourage further analysis (across time) about whether 
shocks are complementary or substitute
35.   
 
The fact that the number of obstacles is positively related to low violence (injuries and curfew) but 
also to the construction of the Wall and to the number of settlement structures brings in the 
question of whether it is a ‘temporary’ security measure or whether it serves geo-political interests 
related to the maintenance of the settlements and the construction of the Wall.  
 
One the one hand, as discussed in Section 3 and illustrated in Maps 2, 3 and 5, the policy of closure 
(proxied by the number of obstacles) is, above all, a mean of protecting Israeli settlers and of 
securing the Israeli road network within the occupied territory, which, in the long-term, clashes 
with the possibility of a continuous Palestinian state within the 1967 borders and, in the short-term, 
negatively affects the Palestinian economy and living conditions. Firstly established in 1991, it can 
not be seen as an ad hoc measure linked to Palestinian security performance. Instead, it needs to be 
understood in the context of the Israeli occupation and other policies within the oPt, which are 
aimed at expanding control and transforming the physical landscape. The policy of closure  
 
                                                            
35 See Appendix 3.   26
On the other hand, the relative positive and strong relationship between the Wall’s confiscated land 
and the number of obstacles could be an indication of their complementarity. While the Wall’s 
confiscated land integrates some of the important settlements, there are many of them that are left 
on the west side and hence in need of the policy of closure. The Wall is not only a tool to annex 
land, but also a permanent tool to restrict the movement  between the West Bank and Jerusalem as 
well as  within the West Bank, between the east- and west-side of the Wall. There are serious 
concerns that it will become the final border 
 
These shocks relationships and particularly their rationale were further explored with primary data. 
The following scheme summarises the results of the interviews as regards the household’s 
perceptions of the conflict-produced shocks during the second Intifada. 
 






In spite of the limited scope of the interviews and therefore the need for further research, they 
reveal an interesting picture of the occupation-produced shocks in the oPt. Vis-à-vis the objectives, 
and one of the most important outputs of the interviews was the shift from the risk events (noted in 
small font in the scheme) to the objectives of the shocks. The shocks are not perceived simply as 
isolated and temporary but rather they are an integral part of a three-factored chain composed of an 
overall cause (Israeli occupation), short-term objectives (violence, land annexation, movement 
restrictions), middle-term objectives (economic strangulation and social fragmentation) and the 
long-term objective (preventing a Palestinian self-existence within the 1967 borders).    27
 
This approach to the risk events recognises the nature of the risk within the specific context of 
vulnerability in the oPt. It includes the endogenous, multi-dimensional, dynamic and chronic nature 
of the occupation, which deliberately threatens not only households’ economics or social capital 
but also their existence within the 1967 borders. Within this context, the endogenous character of 
the occupation-produced shocks goes beyond asset’s uncertainty and a predatory behaviour. Instead 
it pursues livelihoods uncertainty and a wider strategy of domination and dispossession.  
This research argues that the endogenous nature of armed conflict needs to be assessed by taking 
into account the objectives and inter-relationships of the different shocks within the overall conflict 
context and objectives. There would be a fundamental difference if the shocks of movement 
restrictions produced by the policy of closure are thought as a security measure or as a strategy of 
dispossession and domination. If it is the latter, it is to be expected to have a more comprehensive 
and deeper impact on the affected population but also to elicit a stronger response from that 
affected population, who will understandably claim strongly for their lost rights and stolen 
entitlements. 
 
4.2 The Risk Management Strategies 
 
In contexts of armed conflict, risk management has proven to be crucial, as the outcomes of 
conflict depend on the reactions to the effects of conflict at the micro level. As Stewart et al. (2001) 
argues, the so-called resilience, explains the relatively moderate effects of conflict households’ 
welfare. For example, in the oPt, one of the reasons explaining why the economy and society have 
not collapsed during the period 2000-2004 are related to the Palestinians’ capacity and mechanisms 
to manage the drop in their welfare (UNCTAD, 2006). 
 
Despite its importance, while the literature of armed conflicts has paid considerable attention to the 
role of war entrepreneurs in establishing markets of violence and war economies (Keen, 1998; 
2000; Collier and Hoeffler, 1998), there has been much less focus on the analysis of livelihoods 
strategies of civilian populations in conflict. Although some progress has been made in the recent 
years
36, there is a need for research in the identification of risk management strategies during armed 
conflict. At the moment, although different risk-related behaviours have been observed (e.g. 
Verpoorten, 2007; Bundervoet, 2007; Körpf, 2004; UNSCO, 2005; Pain and Lautze, 2002; Nillesen 
                                                            
36 See for example the following studies addressing risk management of households in conflict: buffer-stock 
behaviour (Shemyakina, 2006; Deininger, 2003; OCHA, 2005; Bundervoet, 2007; Verpoorten, 2007; 
Guerrero-Serdan, 2009; Nandi and Di Maio, 2010; Rodríguez and Sánchez, 2009; Chamarbagwala and 
Morán, 2008); risk-sharing (Pain and Lautze, 2002; Körpf, 2004; Goodhand et al., 2002; Harvey, 1998; 
Colleta and Cullen, 2000; Pinchotti and Vewimp (2007); income smoothing (Brück, 2002, UNSCO, 2005, 
Bundervoet, 2007; World Bank, 2004a, Lein, 2004, Deng, 2004; Nillesen and Verwimp, 2010b; Bozzoli et 
al., 2010) ); and risk preferences (Voors et al., 2010).    28
and Verwimp, 2010b), there is a tendency to focus on the households responses observed in natural 
disasters and economic crises disregarding the causes and hence the effects that armed conflict may 
have in the nature and in the specificities of the strategy adopted.   
 
The importance of the causes in the analysis of risk management was firstly raised by Davies 
(1996) in her critique to the strategies’ sequencing (Corbet, 1989) and their use as indicators
37. 
Thus, following her argumentation, the second micro-level implication of the CE approach is that 
risk management strategies need to be defined by their causes taking into account the full 
characteristics of the shocks.  
 
When shocks are endogenous and risk events must be placed at the center of the risk management 
process, the analysis of household risk management strategies cannot be carried out independently 
of the causes, as these provide information about the dynamics of power between the strategies of 
the conflict-produced shocks and the strategies of the conflict-affected households. The fact that 
armed conflicts systematically and deliberately destroy household and community asset bases and 
block responses establishes a particular link between the strategies and the risk events, and makes 
them inter-dependent. As the CE approach well notes, despite the fact that studies on risk 
management, particularly those on coping strategies, has informed policy debate on proactive 
responses taken by people exposed to armed conflict, the studies fail to recognise that some coping 
strategies may involve the transfer of assets away from those in distress (Duffield, 1994).  
 
The following table reporting the actions observed in different surveys
38 in the oPt is a good 
illustration of the way risk management strategies are being analysed in context of armed conflict. 
                                                            
37 The complexity of human livelihoods makes it very difficult to establish clear-cut categories making any 
classification somewhat artificial (Davies, 1996). The mere fact of using a particular strategy can indicate 
nothing about household vulnerability (see findings of de Waal (1989) and Jodha (1975) of people choosing 
hunger rather than selling their assts); it requires instead other type of information beyond the strategy 
descripcion such as the causes and the household’s motivation to choose a specific set of strategies portfolio.  
38 ‘Impact of the Israeli Measures on the Socio-economic Status of the Palestinians’, Palestinian Centre 
Bureau of Statistics 2005; ‘Palestinian Public Perceptions Survey’, Institut Universitaire d`Etudes du 
Développement 2001-2004; ‘Livelihoods, Shocks, and Coping strategies of the WFP Beneficiaries in the 
oPt’, World Food Programme 2004; ‘Food Security Assessment: West Bank and Gaza Strip’, Food 
















Considering these 14 actions, we connote a restrictive view and a clear emphasis on ex-post inter-
temporal consumption mechanisms on detriment of income smoothing strategies and risk sharing. 
Given the importance of these other actions during chronic crisis as well as in covariate and intense 
shocks, where consumption smoothing actions are less useful, one wonders why the intensification 
of the usual income smoothing actions and the adoption of new mechanisms taking into account the 
rise of the informal economy and the households’ withdrawal from the monetized economy have 
not been explored and included in the questionnaire. Regarding risk sharing mechanisms, they have 
been compiled into one single broad action ‘relying on friends and family’, which results in a very 
poor description of the resilient solidarity behaviour and the emerging forms of social capital 
beyond family and friends.  
 
This emphasis on inter-temporal consumption mechanisms has to do with the great interest in 
consumption smoothing behaviour of poor households
39. Although one can not simply look at the 
smoothness of consumption and know which type of smoothing is at work (Morduch, 1995), the 
theories of consumption have dominated the analysis and these are constructed on the assumption 
of a perfect market and hence the lack of need to reduce risk ex ante
40.  
 
Nonetheless, the focus on ex-post and inter-temporal consumption smoothing in the oPt can be 
misleading. On the one hand, the duration of the Israeli-occupation and more specifically the time 
                                                            
39 For a good review on the literature on risk and consumption see Alderman and Paxson (1992). 
40 The interest on consumption is also shared by the Food Security approach, which has largely contributed to 
the analysis of risk management.  
 
Table 5: Frequencies distribution across risk management strategies (percentage) 
Type of 
strategies 
Risk management strategies  Used  Not used  Not 
applicable 




Postponed payment of bills  73   27   0  
Reduced expenditure  69   31   0  
Borrowed money (informally)  41   59  0  
Used savings  32   59   9  
Sold jewellery  9   88   3   
Sold durable goods  1   99   0  
Sold or mortgaged land or house  1   89   10  
Used savings in Israeli banks  0   59   41  
Borrowed from banks/ financial institutions  0   96   4  
        
Income 
smoothing  
Worked in farming or breeding livestock  28  57   15  
Searched for other work  26   72   2  
Sent family member to work  6   90   4  
Sent student family member to work  4   79   17  
        
Risk sharing  Obtained assistance from family and friends  14   86   0  
Source: Palestinian Expenditure and Consumption Survey (2004), Palestinian Centre Bureau of Statistics   30
gap between the onset of the II Intifada and the reporting period of the risk management strategies 
adopted (any month during 2004) requires the inclusion of ex-ante risk management strategies. The 
reason is because there is a need to capture the dynamic and structural nature of the risk 
management responding to the short- and long-term changes of the livelihoods. On the other hand, 
regarding the focus on consumption, in the context of armed conflict, consumption cannot be 
considered as the only basic human need within a hierarchy of concerns and therefore the emphasis 
on those actions that aim to protect expenditure is insufficient. As it will be explained in the next 
section, managing household economics to secure consumption is a piece of a jigsaw of other 
immediate and long-term needs related to the household’s vulnerability.  
 
This narrow perspective observed in the oPt surveys was confirmed by the outcomes of the 
interviews. As might be expected, one of the consequences of the portrayal of risk beyond the risk 
event as discussed previously, is the widening of the scope of risk management strategies. In 
addition to the actions included in PECS, the following responses were reported by the 
interviewees.  
 




Income-based strategies  Livelihoods-based strategies
Eat less and worse  
Making less last longer 
Merge households among kin 
Obtain assistance from 
community associations, civil 
groups, professional groups, 
trade unions, people’s 
committees, charities and 
religious groups  
Obtain assistance from 
international organizations  
Migrate outside the oPt and within the oPt 
Work (and stay) in Israel illegally 
Access restricted areas for searching for jobs or 
working in the agricultural fields.  




In-kind payments  
Moving the business from the town to the city or far 
from closure obstacles 
Selling at the checkpoints 
Pay someone to harvest the crop if you cannot 
access the agricultural field. 
Reduce wage employment and rely on family work 
Replacing risky members with women and elderly in 
the household labour supply 
 
Permanence in the oPt 
Have children 
Construct houses without 
licenses (those living in areas 
C in the West Bank) 
Continue with life in spite of 
the associated-risk produced 
by violence, restrictions of 
movement and land 
annexation: keep going to the 
university despite the long 
journey, celebrating life-cycle 
events, etc.  
Support or join armed groups 
 
 
First of all, it is worth noting that both income and consumption-based strategies are reported 
beyond the limits and generalizations imposed by PECS or other households surveys, illustrating 
the responses to the fragmentation and the building of forms of social and economic capital. For 
example, as a response to the closure-produced economic structural changes, and in line with 
UNSCO (2005) findings, communities located near closure obstacles are drained of economic 
activity and they re-locate to where there is freer movement. Small shops and services have been   31
localized, by expanding directly into small town and rural communities, in order to reach 
consumers, unable to purchase goods far from their community. In the same manner, industry and 
agricultural operations have been relocated to minimize travel, therefore reducing transportation 
costs, securing cheaper inputs and minimizing risk. In addition, the contraction of the circulation of 
cash due to growing unemployment and reduced economic activity is offset by reduced domestic 
demand and by finding alternatives to the use of cash as a means of payment, such as increased 
non-waged labour, share-cropping, barter and in-kind payments.  
 
The household’s responses also illustrate the shift in the traditional labour patterns produced by 
closure. There is an increased role of women and grandparents in the labour force, which 
substitutes for lost male income; a continuing reliance on employment and markets in Israel in spite 
of the risk of being caught, closure-imposed constraints for commuters in terms of costs and time 
and the conditions of life if they decide to stay in Israel for extended periods; an increase in self-
employment, such as opening small-shops, which enables workers to avoid the obstacles faced by 
commuters but barely affords enough income to cover daily necessities; and on waged work in 
other parts of the West Bank such as Ramallah. 
 
Related to these geographical and economic re-configurations is the question about how the 
analysis of risk management can capture the structural and dynamic dimensions of the conflict. As 
previously discussed, in context where conflict is chronic and shocks are repeated over time, the 
analysis of risk management requires to capture the continuous process of change in the 
household’s livelihoods.  
 
Given the general lack of panel data, a way of reflecting this double time dimension of conflict into 
the risk management process would be to use Davies (1996) distinction between coping and 
adapting behaviours. Coping strategies are those short-term and transitory activities, which are 
reserved for periods of unusual stress, and permit people to cope with disruption of the normal 
bundle of entitlements within the prevailing rule system. Adapting strategies are adopted long-term 
as a result of a structural change in the rule system and imply a permanent change in the mix of 
activities required for subsistence irrespective of the year in question.  
 
However, these two behaviours are not distinguishable by their activities and one needs to know 
the reasons for doing them, the timing of their adoption, their sustainability, their effectiveness, 
degree of dependency, frequency and length of use (Davies, 1996). Understanding risk 
management behaviour with respect to these aspects is by far a more complex task than simply 
monitoring whether or not particular activities are being undertaken and assuming their relationship 
with household vulnerability. It is, indeed, argued that a lack of information about these factors is   32
the reason why the complexities of adaptation have not been fully grasped (Shafer, 2002). There is 
a need to modify accordingly the surveys questionnaires.  
 
Disregarding the structural changes occurring during long periods of stress allows focusing on ex-
post strategies and using them as catch-all terms to describe everything that households do over and 
above primary productive activities. It has simply become synonymous with the socio-economics 
of the household or more recently with livelihood security or vulnerability failing to account for 
locational specificities and changes over time. In the context of chronic crises, this focus could be 
rather speculative because it could imply that people do cope and that household insecurity is a 
transitory phenomenon even if the livelihoods are exhausted. Given the dynamic and structural 
changes introduced by the conflict-produced shocks, particularly in chronic conflicts, which 
produced fundamental and irreversible changes in local livelihood systems, presupposing that 
people cope even in subsistence economies, which are no longer viable from the point of view of 
livelihood security, masks the collapse of livelihood systems and blind policy makers and 
researchers to the need for a radical re-appraisal of the requirements of people’s livelihoods in 
conflict-affected areas. Reinforcing coping strategies once livelihoods have been eroded could lock 
the people into a vicious circle of subsistence and coping. 
 
In the context of oPt, one dilemma that policy makers face is how to support adaptation strategies 
without reinforcing the process of fragmentation produced by the policy of closure. While rural and 
small town villagers perceive their own adaptation and coping measures as positive developments, 
worthy of support, the Palestinian Authority and a great part of the donor community want to avoid 
strengthening unsustainable structural changes in the belief that closure will eventually disappear 
and access conditions, both internally and across borders, will steadily improve.  
 
This research argues that key issue is to identify actions that address the social and economic 
fragmentation while transforming the current status quo and contributing hence to a lasting 
reduction in the Palestinian vulnerability. For example, supporting subsistence agriculture could be 
one of those actions as it has become a resilient buffer for a wide range of households against 
closure; and it is bound-up in sensitive issues (land, territory and control over resources) that need 
to be tackled to change the power dynamics which have governed the sectorial allocation of aid and 
have underwritten the process of Palestinian fragmentation. Other example could be the 
strengthening of the social capital. Given the importance of the tight-knit Palestinian social 
structure in preserving their national cause (Hanafi, 2005), and of the informal safety nets in 
whistanding the deteriorating conditions of the II Intifada (World Bank, 2004), there is a need to 
legitimize and support the grassroots associational life, which has been neglected in favour of the   33
donor-driven creation of a civil society through the support of (unelected) NGOs, whose power 
base and prestige has been supported through heavy funding.  
 
To finalise this section, it is worth noting the new set of strategies contained in the third column of 
Table 6, such as the permanence (as opposed to migration), having children (to contribute to the 
demographic growth), constructing without licences, continuing with daily life, supporting and 
joining armed groups. These activities, referred as livelihood-based strategies, have to do more 
with the overall livelihood vulnerability than with the household mapping of consumption and 
income. In fact, they are more related to the long-term objective of the Israeli-occupation of 
preventing the existence of the Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. Although the issue about 
the strategies’ motivation is addressed in the next section, it has already been seen that unlike in 
other type of crisis, armed conflicts introduce uncertainty in the assets. In the oPt, it is the 
uncertainty in the land that provokes the livelihood-based strategies. 
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4.3 The Factors Influencing Risk Management   
 
The last set of micro-implications regards the factors influencing risk management. In the same 
manner that the risk events and the strategies, the determinants of risk management – choice and 
outcome - need to be portrayed within there causes. 
 
One key aspect, although rarely researched, is that of the household’s motivation to choose the 
strategies’ portfolio. Within the framework of risk management in developing countries, it is 
generally assumed that responses are generally taken to deal with the short-term income-
fluctuations and more particularly to deal with the anticipated or actual loss of income associated 
with uncertain risk events and outcomes.  
 
However, as raised in Table 6 and by the emerging literature, the risk-related behaviours observed 
among households affected by conflict suggest the existence of other motives beyond the mapping 
of consumption and income. For example, despite the relevance of the accumulation of livestock as 
a substitute for savings and of investment in human capital as facilitator for economic mobility, 
livestock was not used as a buffer-stock (Bundervoet, 2007; Verpoorten, 2007) and human capital 
was depleted (Deininger, 2003; Shemyakina, 2006; Chamarbagwala and Morán, 2008) because of 
the riskiness attached to the assets. The consequences of risky assets also are illustrated in the 
income smoothing strategies. Households concerned with their own security adjust their labour 
supply by replacing the highly risky members (primarily men within a certain age range) with low-
profile members (e.g. women, children and the elderly) (Körpf, 2004; UNSCO, 2005; Rodríguez 
and Sánchez, 2009). Furthermore, Bundervoet (2007) notes that assets riskiness also affect the 
investment allocations. The asset-rich households do not reduce their allocation of low-risk low-
return activities because assets cannot provide anymore the insurance required by the investment in 
high-risk activities. 
 
All these behaviours may suggest that risk management in the context of armed conflict seems to 
responds to the multi-dimensional effects of armed conflict, in which security-orientated behaviour 
may be significant. Managing household economics to secure consumption is a piece of jigsaw of 
other immediate and long-term needs, which are directly related to the specific context of 
vulnerability. While in Burundi and Rwanda, Verpoorten and Bundervoet framed the vulnerability 
context through asset’s riskiness explained by a predatory behaviour, in the West Bank, as the 
Figure 1 illustrates, a strategy of land dispossession purses the uncertainty of people’s livelihoods 
by economic strangulation and social fragmentation.  
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The fact that people’s risk-related behaviour seems to responds to specific experiences or the 
context goes in line with the emerging research examining the impact of exposure to conflict on 
household’s preferences (Robson, 2002; Hobfoll, 1989). Particularly, Voors et al., (2010) studies 
the social-, risk- and time-preferences in context of conflict. They found that individuals affected 
by conflict are more altruistic, risk seeking and have higher discount rate, which suggest indeed, 
that household’s preferences are endogenous and respond to experiences or the context. Given the 
influence of household’s preferences (particularly those pertaining to evaluate risk and discounting 
the future) on consumption, saving and investment behaviour, this type of finding, although needs 
further corroboration, is of great importance to the study of risk management of households in 
conflict.  
 
The ample approach to household’s motives of risk management has  several implications. Firstly, 
the fact that there are other reasons beyond consumption and income mapping makes explicit the 
power dynamics between the two belligerent parties in a context of political vulnerability. It is 
often the case where the outcomes of a risk event, say poverty or food insecurity, are often the 
outcomes of strategies pursued by armed-conflict winners. For example, as Duffield (1991) noted 
the Dinka of Barhr el Gazal in Sudan have been subjected to extensive cattle raiding and looting 
from the mid 1980s, which resulted in famine conditions. The Dinka were subject to these raids not 
because of their poverty, but because of their natural wealth in cattle. Their vulnerability to these 
raids has been described as part of a long-term process of political de-legitimisation. Another 
example showing how political vulnerability manifests itself in displacement and appropriation of 
property may be that of the occupation of the Palestinian Territories.  
 
While in contexts of exogenous risk events, vulnerability is more associated with the level of 
assets; in the context of endogenous shocks, the source of risk needs also to be considered since it 
impacts people differently according to its target, whether it is ethnic, location, or welfare related. 
When looking into the sources of risks and observing the complexity of power relations and the 
political dimension of the crisis, vulnerability cannot be attributed to market or poverty failure, nor 
characterized as a temporary shock if its continuation is advantageous to the powerful (Duffield, 
1994). Thus, in situations of armed conflict the vulnerability of a community, household or 
individual is closely related to powerlessness, i.e. the political and economic process of neglect, 
exclusion and exploitation (Le Billon, 2000). During wars, power and powerlessness determine the 
distribution of entitlements among and within different groups. Those who lack power are unable 
to safeguard their basic, political, economic and social rights and may find it difficult to protect 
themselves from conflict-produced shocks. 
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Secondly, the wide range of motives for risk management opens a window to the portrayal of the 
response mechanisms as everyday forms of resistance
41. The fact that armed conflicts 
systematically and deliberately destroy household and community asset bases and block responses 
establishes a particular link between the strategies and the risk events and makies them inter-
dependent. Taking into account the interlinkage of motives and the objectives of the occupation-
produced shocks, the resistance of the Palestinian population to the occupation could be measured 
by the continued strength of the parallel economy and social unity.  
 
Set in a context of class struggle, Scott’ resistance framework challenges crucial aspects (related to 
form intentions and gains) of what are acts of resistance. The author of the Weapons of the Week 
and Everdy day forms of Resistance states that there are no unique or predefined forms of resistance 
as they are influenced by the intensity and structure of the system of domination (Scott, 1985). The 
better our recognition and appreciation of it, the better we may be able to assess whether they are 
being resisted, or in what ways they are perceived of being capable of being resisted or not; and the 
better we may recognise certain actions as being forms of resistance.  
 
The acts of resistance do not necessarily need to be intentional, principled-based and effective 
(Scott, 1990). There is a general belief to consider acts of resistance as coming from a conscious 
body exercising an intentional act. This has to do with our tendency to think of resistance as actions 
that involve at least some short-term individual or collective sacrifice in order to bring about a 
long-term collective gain (Scott, 1985). Distinguishing between self-indulgent and principled and 
selfless actions is one thing but to use them as the basic criteria to determinate what constitutes 
resistance is ‘to miss the very wellsprings of the oppressed politics’ (Scott, 1985: 26). For example, 
in the oPt, where the government of Israel exercises total control, the goal of resistance is not 
necessarily to overthrow or transform a system of domination but rather to survive within it.  
 
According to Scott, the intentions are inscribed in the act of everyday form of resistance. In the oPt, 
where material interests of appropriating groups are directly in conflict with the oppressed – via 
land, state and movement – we can infer the intentions from the nature of the actions themselves. It 
is for this reason that Scott’s above-mentioned definition of resistance places particular emphasis 
on the effort to frustrate material and symbolic claims from dominant groups. It is not a 
coincidence that the cries of ‘land’, ‘state’ and ‘bread’ that lie at the core of Palestinian resistance 
are joined to the basic material survival needs of the household. Everyday domination and 
everyday resistance flows from these same fundamental material needs. Thus, the understandable 
                                                            
41 ‘...any act(s) by member(s)of the class that is (are) intended either to mitigate or deny claims (e.g. rents, 
taxes, deference) made on that class by super-ordinate classes (e.g. landlords, the stte, owners of machinery, 
moneylenders) or to advance its own claims (e.g. work, land, charity, respect) vis-à-vis these superordinates 
clases (Scott, 1985: 22).    37
desire to survive – by ensuring physical safety, food supply, income, etc. – identifies the sources of 
resistance to the claims of the oppressor (Scott, 1985). Consumption from this perspective is both 
the goal and the result of resistance and counter-resistance
42.  Therefore, ignoring the self-interest 
element of involvement in the conflict is to ignore the determining context. It is precisely the fusion 
of self-interest and collective principles that is the vital force animating the resistance (Scott, 1985). 
Thus, when the Palestinian react in a utilitarian and individualistic fashion against the powerful 
forces destroying their assets and blocking their livelihoods, they are also engaging in their 
nationalist struggle. In acting to marginally increase their chance of survival against devastating 
odds, they are also carrying acts of resistance.  
 
This conception of risk management strategies as everyday forms of resistance was found during 
the interviews carried out during the research field work. Palestinians acknowledged the political 
struggle in everyday life by referring to strategies and overall risk management behaviour with the 
Arabic word, sumud. Gaining a central place in Palestinian political discourse during the 1970s, the 
symbol of sumud (steadfastness, persistence, endurance) points to two characteristics that can be 
ubiquitously found among Palestinians. On the one hand, preserving deep roots in the homeland; 
on the other, stubbornly going on with life and keeping hope for the future despite all the 
adversities that are faced, including occupation, discrimination, expulsion, and international 
negligence. At its core, sumud refers to the refusal to give up on Palestinian rights and dignity. 
 
Also in this line, Daines and Seddon (1991) argue that coping strategies, although they are 
essentially ‘defensive’ strategies providing little potential for changing the circumstances, are a 
form of resistance. All struggle involving an active engagement with the immediate environment 
has the potential for development into a more extensive forms of struggle with greater capacity of 
expanding the room of manoeuvre and for changing the conditions within which the struggle takes 
place. Thus, without dismissing the risk to romanticize the weapons of the weak that are unlikely to 
do more than marginally affect the various forms of exploitation that the oppressed confront, the 
effectiveness of the acts of resistance cannot be used as a determining factor in deciding whether a 
behaviour is or not an act of resistance. Given the endogenous nature of conflict-produced shocks, 
resistance cannot just be considered as those acts contributing to a revolutionary consequence 
and/or be selfless, the actions that take place at the most basic individual level with the most 
limited and immediate objectives should be recognised as acts of resistance. 
 
                                                            
42 Lifting this argument to the meso and macro level, where the causes of violence are discussed and 
portrayed to a greater extent as greed vs grievance, we can find a parallelism with Duffield’s critique of 
Collier’s argumentation (about shifting the causes of violence from grievance to greed). Duffield states that 
even though warring parties usually base themselves on narratives of grievance, it is greed that is the primary 
force. Greed is both the goal and the result of grievance-motivated resitance (Duffield, 2001).   38
The third and last implication of the various motives of household’s in conflict risk management is 
that it leaves room to explain other risk management behaviour such as the livelihoods-based 
strategies. Recalling from Table 6, the Palestinians, in response to the movement restrictions and 
the annexation of land promoted by the Government of Israel to maintain the settlement structures 
within the West Bank, engage in high-risk activities to manage the households economics and also 
to claim for their rights of movement and living within the territory as set by 1967 Israeli-
Palestinian borders. It could be said that the multiple and interlinked effects of armed conflict 
unfold into risk management by blurring the boundaries between consumption-stress-driven and 
other livelihood needs related to the context of vulnerability. 
 
Understanding the factors influencing risk management during armed conflicts requires a shift from 
the risk outcomes to the risk events. If the assumption of risk events as exogenous factors has 
allowed taking away the casualty from the risk events and defining the risk management 
determinants purely through economic factors (mostly associated with poverty or assets), then 
acknowledging the endogenous nature of factors entails apportioning some part of the cause to the 
risk events themselves and using them as effective variables that would explain the differential 
household vulnerability seen across households and community groups. Furthermore, the linkages 
between the indirect and direct effects of war are important. While some research explicitly 
recognises their linkage (e.g. Verwimp, 2005a; Richards, 1996) it is common to ignore the 
interconnection and present the indirect effects as the ultimate explanatory factor. However, if it is 
acknowledged that during armed conflict, household’s impoverishment is often the goal of 
strategies pursued by armed conflict winners, then, there is a need to study the interactions between 
impoverishment and the conflict-produced shocks. More generally, there research is encouraged to 
unpack the power dynamics between the strategies of the conflict-affected households and those of 
the conflict-produced shocks. 
 
The study of the determinants of the use of violence by the emerging literature and the risk-
management profiles constructed within the framework of this investigation, are good test beds to 
link symptoms with causes and start understanding the multiple and interlinked causes of risk 
management. 
 
As regards the determinants of the use of violence (e.g. Nillesen and Verwimp, 2010b; Justino, 
2008, Guichaoua 2007), the oPt is a good laboratory to study the different approaches because the 
extensive information on the determinants of militia fighters, and particularly about suicide 
bombers. Within this context, it could be said that there are two main narratives: the studies of 
Berrebi (2003) and Krueger and Malecková (2003) that analyses suicide attacks by economic   39
variables; and the work of Saleh (2004b) and other authors
43 that explains the strategy of 
Palestinian suicide bombers through the risk events. 
  
One of the limitation of the first type of narrative is that it fails to consider the full range of 
stressors – economic, political, social and physiological – and restricts its attention to economic 
factors consigning other factors to a black box. By implicitly assuming that the utility function of 
Palestinian militants depends only on economic variables such as education and poverty and 
nothing else, the authors did not investigate other factors related to economics that can cause 
political tensions. In its place, they argue that ‘instead of viewing terrorism as a direct response to 
low market opportunities or ignorance, we suggest it is more accurately viewed as a response to 
ideological factors, political conditions and long-standing feelings of indignity and frustration that 
have little to do with economics’ (Krueger and Malecková, 2003: 119).  
 
According to Saleh (2004b), this detachment of economic factors from ideological motives 
neglects the nature of the political struggle; and fails to account for the socio-political pressures 
resulting from it, such as anger, frustration and alienation as well as the desire for retaliation and 
revenge on behalf of the individual’s commitment to nationalist aspirations of freedom and 
independence, which are not irrational or gratuitous but linked to the consequences of the territorial 
fragmentation occurring in the oPt.  
 
In order to delineate the importance of economic variables in the Palestinian political struggle, 
Saleh decided to move beyond poverty and education and attempted to understand the suicide 
attacks (suicide shootings and bombers) by proxying the IDF military operations
44 through the 
number of Palestinian killed and the policy of closure through per capita income and 
unemployment.  According to his estimated models suicide, while an increase in the Palestinian per 
capita income as well as a reduction in unemployment rate will reduce Palestinian attacks against 
Israel, particularly shooting attacks, a reduction of the suicide attacks will just take place if Israel 
halts its policy of selective targeting of Palestinian political leaders
45 (Saleh, 2004b).  
 
                                                            
43 Yom and Saleh (2994), Kashan (2003) and Al-Sarraj (2003). 
44 Killings, injuries, home demolitions, detention of suspect Palestinians without charge or relatives of 
suspect. confiscation of land, etc. 
45 Yom and Saleh’s (2004) data base of suicide attacks – shootings and bombings which occurred during the 
second Intifada - revealed that out of 87 individuals, 44 of them had been exposed to IDF military measures. 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) explain that brutal and indiscriminate actions can increase participation in violence 
by turning ‘local non-combatants into rebel forces’. Along with this view, is the analysis of the psychiatrist 
Eyad Al Sarraj: ‘the people who are committing suicide bombings in this Intifada are the children of the first 
Intifada-people, who witnessed so much trauma as children. So as they grew up, their own identity merged 
with the national identity of humiliation and defeat and they avenge that defeat at both the personal and 
national levels’ (Al Sarraj, 2003:37).   40
The second approach to the multiple and interlinked causes of risk management is the construction 
of risk management profiles. Thus, in order to understand the relevance of the risk events over the 
outcomes, and address the risk management strategies within their causes, groups were set, based 
on the specificities of the oPt and availability of data, to illustrate household asset base and 
residence’s location characteristics. While the household asset base proxies the household-related 




Table 7: Variables included in the risk management profiles 
 
Risk management strategies  Occupation-produced shocks
1 
 
Relying on subsistence agriculture  
Adjusting household labour supply  




No.Palestinian killed  
Village wall proximity  
Village closure index  
Village wall enclosure   
 
Control variables 
Aggregate measures of poverty (poverty line) and vulnerability (maximum coping period) 
Households demographics (sex, age, household size) 
Employment of the household head (status, job location, employment sector, dependency ratio) 
Education level of the household head  
Land and livestock ownership. 
Community population size 
Location type (rural, urban, refugee camp) 
Governorate of residence 
Distance to the city 
(1) Out of the conflict data, four variables were selected to represent the Israeli occupation in 2004 at 
the village level 
(2) The strategy of community risk sharing includes informal borrowing and postponing payment of 
bills. Although these two last strategies are normally considered as inter-temporal consumption 
smoothing examples, in the context of the oPt they are more risk sharing related. Informal borrowing 
rarely occurs with moneylender schemes but is a common practice among in-laws and neighbours; 
given the flexibility of payment among them one can argue that informal borrowing follows a rationale 
which is more characteristic of spatial than inter-termporal consumption smoothing (World Bank, 
2004a). As for the delay in the payment of bills, it has been possible because government and private 
companies have assumed their costs; by subsidizing electricity and water bills, the government and 
private companies have allowed these services to continue despite the non-payment of bills (Sletten 
and Pederson, 2003). 
 
In the analysis of these conditional associations, rather than being interested in the specific extent 
of use of risk management strategies in different conflict settings (according to nature and 
intensity), we are interested in the type of change
47 the control variable introduces into the 
relationship studied; i.e. how different is the relationship ‘strategy-shock’ among households 
exposed to similar type of shocks but differentiated by household’s comparative advantages in 
terms of consumption poverty, demographics, skills and labour endowments? How different is the 
                                                            
46 Conflict-produced shocks can target people based on their welfare, ethnic origin, location, etc. In the case 
of the oPt, where the issue of contention is related to land and more generally space, as Hanafi (2008) argued, 
residence location is particularly relevant in determining conflict geography.  
47 The change is classified according to three behaviours: i) the control variable introduces changes in the 
direction of the association; ii) the control variable introduces changes just in the shape of the relationship; 
iii) the control variable introduces no changes in the association.    41
relationship ‘strategy-shock’ among households exposed to similar type of shocks but 
differentiated by residence’s location characteristics? 
 
Regarding the relationship between income smoothing strategies and shocks, we have observed 
that despite the importance of the strategies of farming and adjusting household labour supply 
during covariate and long crises, in the context of armed conflicts such as the oPt, their reliance 
seems to be determined by the nature of the shock. Thus, while the use of income smoothing 
strategies decreases (sometimes in a non-linear manner) with the intensity of violence and Wall-
related shocks, it increases with the intensity of village closure
48. Assuming that the intensity of the 
shocks increases the need to use income smoothing strategies then, a reduction of income 
smoothing can be interpreted as either the household’s lack of means or access to the means is 
blocked
49. The difference observed across the shock types seems to back up the blockage 
hypothesis. It is as if the violence- and the Wall-related shocks exercise bigger pressure on income 
smoothing strategies than the closure-related shocks. In fact, the space of movement and hence the 
possibility for a livelihood is reduced to a greater extent by violence and Wall enclosure than by the 
village closure. While violence confines the people to their homes and the Wall to their villages, 
village closure restricts household movements between the village and the natural centre, which has 
been assumed to be the closest village or city with a hospital.  
 
In order to test for the lack of means hypothesis, the negative relationships were examined across 
households
50. We observed that households, regardless of their comparative advantages (skills and 
labour endowments or capital access), living in high-violence and Wall-enclosed villages rely on 
income smoothing strategies to a lesser extent than those living in low-violence and Wall-affected 
locations. This comparison seems to suggest that access to agricultural land and labour markets in 
high conflict-affected villages is not determined by household assets as much as by IDF violence 
and Wall-related enclosure, which deliberately block the access and restrict movement not only 
reducing the options relying on the markets but also those depending on the informal economy and 
subsistence forms of living.  
 
                                                            
48 See Appendix 4 Part I for the frequency distribution of income smoothing strategies across conflict-
produced shocks at the village level. 
49 In theory, it could be that the decrease in use of risk management strategies may reflect an improvement in 
the family economic situation. However, this seems unlikely in the context of this study, since average 
income in 2004 continued to fall and poverty rates continued to be higher than they were prior to the crisis 
(World, Bank, 2004a).  
50 See Appendix 4 Part II for the negative and significant conditional associations.   42
The analysis of the conditional associations distributions shows a low number of modifier effect 
variables
51. Bearing in mind the limitations of the bivariate analysis, this lack of change in the 
directional nature of the relationship could be an indication of the little space of manoeuvring that 
the occupation-produced shocks leave to other factors to radically influence the impact of the shock 
on the income smoothing strategies. In addition, the fact that the majority of the modifier effects 
are introduced by location and not by household characteristics is in line with the previously raised 
argument that community characteristics influence the exposure, the impact and the ability to 
bounce back. In order to further research this, future analysis is needed to assess whether the 
community power to override the nature of the relationship between income smoothing conflict-
produced shocks is because of public infrastructure, political ideology, presence of armed groups, 
proximity to Israeli infrastructure, etc.  
 
In the case of risk sharing profiles
52, we noted that the majority of the factors introducing modifier 
effects were related to the location of the households rather than their comparative advantages in 
terms of skills, welfare or labour endowments. However, if we compare the distribution of the 
conditional relationships between income smoothing and risk sharing strategies, the household 
variables seem to be more relevant among the latter than the former; it is as if risk sharing is more 
under the control of households than income smoothing actions, whose choice and effectiveness 
seem to be more affected by violence and the policy of closure.  
 
Within the conditional associations of risk sharing, we studied the cases where risk sharing seems 
to be more resilient. In line with the contradictory and complex processes affecting social capital 
during conflict (e.g. Pinchotti and Verwimp, 2007; Goodhand et al., 2000; Körpf, 2004), we 
observed that the Palestinian reliance on risk sharing across shock intensity changes across 
strategies and shocks type. Unlike the income smoothing, the conditional analysis provides a scarce 
empirical basis and prevents any conclusion to be drawn. Based on the risk sharing profiles, further 
analysis is encouraged to explore the determinants of risk sharing. But rather than giving all the 
attention to the type of social capital
53, it is suggested to include the factors that appeared relevant 
in this preliminary analysis such as nature of the group (e.g. family, community or nationality-
based, etc.), which sets up membership restrictions and the norms of reciprocity and trust; the 
source of the shock (e.g. IDF violence, village closure, Wall-related closure and land annexation, 
                                                            
51 Control variables are said to introduce modiffer effects when they change the direction of the association. 
For example, poverty would be a modiffer effect control variable if the poor households reduce the use of 
farming when village violence increases, while non-poor households increase farming as village violence 
increases. See Appendix 4 Part III contains a summary of the type of behaviour observed in the studied 
conditional associations. 
52 See Appendix 5 .  
53 For a debate about bridging and bonding social capital in context of armed conflict see Colleta and Cullen 
(2000), Richards (1996), Harvey (1998) and Körpf (2004).   43
etc.) influencing the creation and destruction of social capital; as well as the household and 
community characteristics shaping both the strength of social capital and exposure to the conflict.  
 
5. Conclusions and future analysis  
 
The aim of this paper was to investigate the micro implications of the CE approach into the 
household risk behaviour, specifically how the characteristics of armed conflict unfold into the 
households risk management.  
 
By analysing the case study of West Bank during the period following the onset of the II Intifada, 
the research identifies some of the distinctive features and elements of risk management of 
households in conflict demonstrating that that there is much to understand beyond the explanations 
offered for conflict-related coping. In fact, there is enough evidence to belief that risk management 
responds to household conflict experiences and shocks characteristics. In the same manner that the 
risk management framework was adapted to developing countries, contexts characterised by 
uncertainty and liquidity constraints, it also needs to be adapted to contexts of armed conflict, 
where risk are endogenous, dynamic and multidimensional.  
 
Overall, one needs to move beyond the illustration of the conflict by single, exogenous and 
temporary shocks and integrate its different dimensions and time dynamics capturing the overall 
rationale. The identification of household risk management strategies need to illustrate the building 
forms of capital within the specific context of vulnerability, where actions of coping, adapting and 
resisting respond to a jigsaw of interlinked immediate and long-term motivations – economic, 
security, and powerlessness. If vulnerability can not be attributed to market or poverty failure 
because its continuation is advantageous to the powerful, then the determinants of risk management 
can not be viewed merely from an economic viewpoint, detached from the political context which 
influences the distribution of entitlements among and within different groups.   
 
Since very little is known about the risk management process in the context of conflict, efforts are 
needed to explore it from scratch without the lens of risk management during natural disasters or 
economic crises. To start with, and in line with the work of Brück et al. (2010) about the 
identification of violent conflict in micro-level surveys, it is important that household surveys are 
modified accordingly containing information about conflict-produced risk events and risk 
management strategies. Vis-à-vis the former, the characteristics of spread, intensity and 
predictability should be studied together with the specific causes and the intrinsic features – 
multidimensional, dynamic and endogenous. Regarding the latter, the strategies’ efficiency and 
sustainability as well as the households’ dependency and motivation need to be explored. Of   44
course, this is a more demanding exercise in terms of coding, data interpretation and so forth, but it 
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Map 2: Oslo peace process geographical demarcation of the oPt 
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Map 4: Status of the Wall construction, December 2003 
 
Source: Palestinian Negotiations Affaire Department (NAD) and Negotiations Support Unit 
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Type Organizations  chosen 
 
Organizations or institutions directly 
involved with the analysis of 
Palestinian responses to the crisis 
 
World Food Programme  
United Nation Special Coordinator Office for the Middle East  
United Nations Food Agriculture Organizations  
Acción contra el Hambre 
Stop the Wall Campaign, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics  
International Palestinian Youth League  
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugee in the Near East 
 
Palestinian research institutes carrying 
out micro-analysis of the conflict 
Palestinian Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) 
Palestinian Society for Regional Studies, Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ),  
Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA). 
 
Israeli (and Palestinian) Non-
governmental organizations  
Alternative Information Centre (AIC) 
Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights (B`Tselem) 
Machsom Watch 
Beit Salom, Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICHAD). 
 
Donors   The European Union (EU) 
World Bank 
 
The Spanish Development Agency 
and Spanish NGOS 
Agencia Española de cooperación internacional para el desarrollo Asociación para la cooperación 
con el Sur (ACSUR las Segovias) 
Paz y Tercer Mundo (PTM) 
Solidaridad Internacional 
Movimiento para la paz (MPDL) 
Cruz Roja 
 
Focus groups participants 
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APPENDIX 2: MOVEMENT RESTRICTION INDEX 
Based on the type of roads (primary and secondary), and the type of obstacle (manned (checkpoint) 
and unmanned(roadblock), the following assumptions have been made. Firstly, Palestinians 
generally want to avoid checkpoints either because they don’t hold a permit when required or 
because they want to avoid the long waiting time or the humiliation that often takes place at the 
checkpoint. Secondly, the main road is preferred as it is better paved and it is a faster route. Based 
on them, the closure index has been constructed to measure the degree of movement restrictions 
imposed on the main and most direct routes and on identifiable alternative secondary roads 
connecting the village with its natural centre. The natural centre has been defined as the closest 
town or village with a hospital. It coincides almost always with the governorate capital. In the case 
of the governorate capital the village index equals 0.  
 
Table 2: Movement restrictions index 
1
st Road  2
nd road  Score  Explanations  Legend 
￿  ￿  0  People and vehicles will use the main road.   
￿= clear road 
 
￿     = checkpoint 
 
∆     =  roadblock 
 
 
￿  ∆  0  People and vehicles will use the main road. 
∆  ￿  1  Private vehicles (including trucks) are forced to use a secondary 
road. 
 
People will travel by public transport on the main road. In this 
case, Palestinians have to get out of the car, cross the roadblock 
by foot and get into another vehicle.  
∆  ∆  2  People, as above, and trucks will use the back-to-back system 
(trucks will be off-loaded and then reloaded at the other side of 
the roadblock.), dramatically increasing transport costs.  
￿   ￿  3  Secondary roads are the only option in order to avoid checkpoints 
￿   ∆  4  People and private vehicles are forced to use the back-to-back 
system.  
￿    ￿  5  People and private vehicle traffic are compulsorily subject to 
permit possession or check. 
 
The following table provides the status of closure of main (M) and secondary (S) roads as well as 
the closure index (R) for each specific sampled village across time.  
   61
 
Table 3: Village closure  
         Village  Natural 
 Centre  Dec03  Jan 2004  March04  July 2004  November 
2004  April 2005  August 2005  January 
2006  June 2006 
    M S R M S R M S R M S R M S R M S R M S R M S R M S R 
Ad Doha  Bethlehem  ￿    0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Al 'Aza (Beit Jibrin) RC  Bethlehem  ￿    0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Ash Shawawra  Bethlehem  ∆  1  ∆ ￿ 1  ∆ ￿ 1  ∆ ￿ 1  ∆ ￿ 1  ∆ ￿ 1  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
'Ayda Camp  Bethlehem  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Beit Jala  Bethlehem  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Beit Sahur  Bethlehem  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Bethlehem  Bethlehem  ￿     ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿     ￿  0  ￿    
Wadi al 'Arayis  Bethlehem  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Za'tara  Bethlehem  ∆ ￿ 1  ∆ ￿ 1  ∆ ￿ 1  ∆ ￿ 1  ∆ ￿ 1  ∆ ￿ 1  ￿ ￿ 0  ￿ ￿ 0  ￿ ￿ 0 
Adh Dhahiriya  Hebron  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆ ￿ 1  ∆ ￿ 1  ￿ ￿ 3  ￿ ￿ 3 
Al Arrub Camp    ∆ ￿ 2  ∆ ￿ 2  ∆ ￿ 2  ∆ ￿ 2  ∆ ￿ 2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2 
Al Fawwar Camp  Hebron  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4 
As Samu'  Hebron  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  2  ￿  ∆  2  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4 
Ash Shuyukh  Hebron  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2 
Beit Kahil  Hebron  ￿  na  0  ￿ na 0  ￿ na 0  ￿ na 0  ￿ na 0  ∆ na 2  ∆ na 2  ∆ na 2  ∆ na 2 
Halhul Hebron  ∆ ￿ 2  ∆ ￿ 2  ∆ ￿ 2  ∆ ￿ 2  ∆ ￿ 2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2 
Hebron (Al Khalil)  Hebron  ￿      ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿     ￿  0  ￿    
Hitta Hebron  ∆ ￿ 1  ∆ ￿ 1  ∆ ￿ 1  ∆ ￿ 1  ￿ ￿ 3  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4 
Idhna Hebron  ∆ ￿ 1  ∆ ￿ 1  ∆ ￿ 1  ∆ ￿ 1  ￿ ￿ 3  ￿ ￿ 3  ￿ ￿ 3  ￿ ￿ 3  ￿ ￿ 3 
I'zeiz Hebron  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4 
Khursa Hebron  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ￿  ∆  4  ￿ ￿ 3  ￿ ￿ 3  ￿ ￿ 3  ￿ ￿ 3 
Sa'ir Hebron  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2 
Shuyukh al 'Arrub    ∆ ￿ 2  ∆ ￿ 2  ∆ ￿ 2  ∆ ￿ 2  ∆ ￿ 2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2 
Taffuh Hebron  ￿    0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Yatta Hebron  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4 
Al Judeida      (Jadida)  Jenin  na      ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿ ￿ 3  ￿ ￿ 3  ￿ ￿ 3  ∆ ￿ 1  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Al Yamun  Jenin        ￿ ￿ 3  ￿  0  ￿  0  ∆ ￿ 1  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Arraba Jenin        ￿  ∆  4  ∆  ∆  2  ∆ ￿ 1  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  2  ￿  ∆  2  ￿  0  ∆ ￿ 1 
Ash Shuhada  Jenin        ￿  ∆  4  ∆  ∆  2  ∆ ￿ 1  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Jaba' Jenin        ￿  ∆  4  ∆  ∆  2  ∆ ￿ 1  ￿ ￿ 3  ￿ ￿ 3  ￿ ￿ 3  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Jenin Jenin  ￿      ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿     ￿  0  ￿    
Jenin Camp  Jenin        ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Kafr Ra'i  Jenin        ￿  ∆  4  ∆  ∆  2  ∆ ￿ 1  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Meithalun Jenin        ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿ ￿ 3  ￿ ￿ 3  ￿ ￿ 3  ∆ ￿ 1  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Ti'innik Jenin        ￿ ￿ 3  ￿  0  ￿  0  ∆ ￿ 1  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Ya'bad Jenin        ￿  ∆  4  ∆  ∆  1  ∆  ∆  1  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4 
Zububa Jenin        ￿ ￿ 3  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Al 'Auja  Jericho  ∆ ￿ 1  ∆ ￿ 1  ∆ ￿ 1  ∆ ￿ 1  ￿ ￿ 3  ￿ ￿ 3  ￿ ￿ 3  ￿ ￿ 3  ￿ ￿ 3 
Al Jiftlik  Jericho  ∆ ￿ 1  ∆ ￿ 1  ∆ ￿ 1  ∆ ￿ 1  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5 
Aqbat Jaber Camp  Jericho  ￿    0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿     ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
'Ein ad Duyuk al Fauqa  Jericho  ￿    0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
'Ein ad Duyuk at Tahta    ￿    0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
'Ein as Sultan Camp  Jericho  ￿    0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Jericho (Ariha)    ￿      ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿     ￿  0  ￿    
'Askar Camp  Nablus  ￿  ￿  0  ￿ ￿ 0  ￿ ￿ 0  ￿ ￿ 0  ￿ ￿ 0  ￿ ￿ 0  ￿ ￿ 0  ￿ ￿ 0  ￿ ￿ 0 
Balata Camp  Nablus  ￿  ￿  0  ￿ ￿ 0  ￿ ￿ 0  ￿ ￿ 0  ￿ ￿ 0  ￿ ￿ 0  ￿ ￿ 0  ￿ ￿ 0  ￿ ￿ 0 
Beit Furik  Nablus  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5 
Burin Nablus  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿ ￿ 4  ￿ ￿ 4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4 
Huwwara Nablus  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4 
Ijnisinya Nalbus  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4 
Kafr Qallil  Nablus  ￿  ￿  0  ￿ ￿ 0  ￿ ￿ 0  ￿ ￿ 0  ￿ ￿ 0  ￿ ￿ 0  ￿ ￿ 0  ￿ ￿ 0  ￿ ￿ 0 
Nablus   ￿      ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿     ￿  0  ￿    
Qabalan Nablus  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆    ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4 
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Table 3: Village closure (continuation) 
         Village  Natural  
center  Dec03  Jan 2004  March04  July 2004  November 
2004  April 2005  August 2005  January 
2006  June 2006 
    M S R M S R M S R M S R M S R M S R M S R M S R M S R 
Qusin Nablus  ￿  ￿  5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿    ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4 
Sabastiya Nablus  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4 
Tell Nablus  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 3  ￿ ￿ 3 
An Nabi Elyas  Qalqilya  na      ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5 
'Azzun Qalqilya        ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5 
Hajja Qalqilya        ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5 
'Isla Qalqilya        ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5 
Kafr Thulth  Qalqilya        ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5  ￿  5 
Qalqiliya   ￿      ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿     ￿  0  ￿    
Al Am'ari Camp  Ramallah  ￿    0  ￿  0  na     ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿     ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Al Bireh   Ramallah  ￿  0  ￿  0      ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿     ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Al Jalazun Camp   Ramallah  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2      ∆  ∆  2  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5 
Al Mazra'a ash Sharqiya   Ramallah  ￿ ￿ 3  ￿ ￿ 3      ￿ ￿ 3  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5 
Al Mughayyir   Ramallah  ￿ ￿ 3  ￿ ￿ 3      ￿ ￿ 3  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿    ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5 
'Arura   Ramallah  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4      ￿  ∆  4  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿    ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5 
'Atara   Ramallah  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4      ￿  ∆  4  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿    ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5 
Beituniya   Ramallah  ￿  0  ￿  0      ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿     ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Beit Liqya   Ramallah  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5 
Deir Ibzi'   Ramallah  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2      ∆  ∆  2  ∆ ￿ 2  ∆ ￿ 2  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Kafr 'Ein   Ramallah  ￿ na 5  ￿ na 5      ￿ na 4  ￿ na 5  ￿ na    ￿ na 5  ￿ na 5  ￿ na 5 
Qarawat Bani Zeid   Ramallah  ￿ na 5  ￿ na 5      ￿ na 4  ￿ na 5  ￿ na    ￿ na 5  ￿ na 5  ￿ na 5 
Ramallah   ￿      ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿     ￿  0  ￿    
Silwad  Ramallah  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4      ￿  ∆  4  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿    ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5 
Silwad Camp  Ramallah  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4      ￿  ∆  4  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿    ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5 
Biddya Salfit  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5 
Deir Istiya  Salfit  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ na 5  ￿ na 5  ￿ na 5  ￿ na 5 
Farkha Salfit  ￿    0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Kafr ad Dik  Salfit  ￿    0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Kifl Haris  Salfit  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ na 5  ￿ na 5  ￿ na 5  ￿ na 5 
Mas-ha Salfit  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ ￿ 5 
Qarawat Bani Hassan  Salfit  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  4  ￿  ∆  5  ￿ ￿ 5  ￿ na 5  ￿ na 5  ￿ na 5  ￿ na 5 
Salfit Salift  ￿      ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿     ￿  0  ￿    
Yasuf Salfit  ∆ na 2  ∆ na 2  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿ na 5  ￿ na 5  ￿ na 5  ￿ na 5  ￿ na 5 
'Aqqaba Tubas  ￿    0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
El Far'a Camp  Tubas  ￿    0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Ras al Far'a  Tubas  ￿    0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Tammun Tubas  ￿    0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Tayasir Tubas  ￿    0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Tubas Jenin  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆  ∆  2  ∆ ￿ 1  ∆ ￿ 1  ∆ ￿ 1  ￿ ￿ 0  ￿ ￿ 0 
An Nazla al Gharbiya  Tulkarem  ￿ ￿ 0  ∆ ￿ 0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
'Anabta  Tulkarem  ∆ ￿ 1  ∆ ￿ 1  ∆ ￿ 1  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Dhinnaba  Tulkarem  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Far'un  Tulkarem  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿    
Nur Shams Camp  Tulkarem  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Qaffin  Tulkarem  ￿ na 5  ∆ na 2  ￿  0  ￿  0  ∆ na 2  ∆ na 2  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0 
Tulkarm  Tulkarem  ￿     ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿  0  ￿     ￿  0  ￿    




APPENDIX 3: CONFLICT STATISTICS  
 Coefficient of correlation between the conflict-produced shocks 
  Land annexation  Violence 
  Governorate Village  Governorate  &  village  Governorate 





Built-up area  
Settlement 
Municipal area  
Wall confiscated 
land area 




Palestinian injured  
Curfew hours (governorate/village)  0.01*  0.10*  0.04*  -0.23*  -0.27*  0.08  1     
Palestinians killed (governorate/village)  -0.35*  -0.37*  -0.22*  -0.30*  -0.06*  0.35    1   
Palestinians injured (governorate)  0.53*  0.37*  0.58*  0.25*  0.49*  Na
.    1 
Movement restrictions              
No. Obstacles (governorate)  0.51*  0.06*  0.05*  0.29*  0.49*  na  0.48*  0.17*  0.50* 
Village Closure Index  Na  Na  Na  Na  Na  -0.15  -0.19  -0.34*  na 
Village Wall Enclosure  na  na  na  na  na  1*  0.09  0.35*  na 
Note: The Pearson coefficient of correlation is used for interval or scale variables. Goodman and Kurskals’s gamma is used for ordinal categorical variables.  
Note: * = significant at the 0.05 percentage level using Pearson chi-square test 









 Jenin  Tubas  Tulkarem  Nablus  Qalqilya  Salfit Ramallah  Jericho  Bethlehem  Hebron 
Variables  Sum/ 
Mean  St.Dev  Sum/
Mean  St.Dev.  Sum/ 
Mean  St.Dev  Sum/ 
Mean  St.Dev.  Sum/ 
Mean  St.Dev  Sum/ 
Mean  St.Dev  Sum/ 
Mean  St.Dev  Sum/ 
Mean  St.Dev.  Sum/ 
Mean  St.Dev  Sum/ 
Mean  St.Dev. 
No. Injured by governorate 2000-04 2241   na   1209    3016   1315   294  5035   359   1220   2764   
No. Injured  by  governorate 2001 1555    1555    725    1050  978    63   3951  312    988   1856   
No. Injured  by  governorate 2002  381    381    304    878    171    9    590    5    135    422   
No. Injured  by  governorate 2003  181    181    138    610    107    2    103    6    34    222   
No. Injured  by  governorate  2004  124    124    42    478    59    220    391    36    63    264   
No. Killed  by  governorate 2000-04  262    37    173    371    55    25    129    2    97    162   
No. Killed  by  governorate 2001  61    10    42    81    20    14    43    2    40    60   
No. Killed  by  governorate 2002  124    21    69    162    20    6    65    0    43    62   
No. Killed  by  governorate 2003  37    5    34    59    8    2    10    0    10    27   
No. Killed  by  governorate 2004  40    2    28    69    7    3    11    0    4    13   
No. hours curfew by governorate 2002-
02  21775   3504  49935   55143   7123   4330  15182   2126  27699   15662   
No. hours curfew by governorate 2002  15461    3192    38492    41998    5059    3216    12297    24    20530    7786   
No. hours curfew by governorate 2003  5578    288    10974    11590    1672    708    2242    96    5891    7079   
No. hours curfew by governorate 2004  736    24    469    1555    392    406    643    6    1278    697   
Dummy village within 1 km of Wall 
2000-04  0.166 0.577 0  0  0.75  1.03  0  0  1.33  1.03 0.444 0.88 0.466 0.83  0  0  1.111  1.05  0  0 
Dummy village within 1 km of Wall 
2003  0.083 0.28 0  0  0.375  0.517  0  0 0.666  0.51 0.222 0.44  0.2  0.41 0  0  0.55 .52  0  0 
Dummy villages within 1 km of Wall 
2004  0.083 0.28 0  0  0.375  0.517  0  0 0.666  0.51  0.222  0.44 0.26 0.45 0  0  0.55  .52  0  0 
No. obstacles by governorate 2003-
2004  126.75   9    76    239    76   112.75  159.75  30.5   193.75  0  388.25   
No. obstacles by governorate 2003  60    4    40    119    36    70    65    13    95    179   
No. obstacles by governorate 3004  66.75    5    36    120    40    42.75    94.75    17.5    98.75    209.25   
Village Closure Index 2003-04  3.86  2.824  0.66  1.62  1.06  2.45  5.52  4.11  8.332  4.082  4.944  4.1  5.526  3.941  0.745  1.27  0.88  1.44  3.62 2.35 
Village Closure Index 2003  1.93  1.41  0.33  0.81  0.75  1.75  2.75  2.05  4.166  2.041  2.444  1.943  2.733  1.944  0.285  0.48  0.44  0.72  1.75 1.18 
Village Closure Index 2004  1.93  1.41  0.33  0.81  0.31  0.70  2.77  2.06  4.166  2.041  2.5  2.157  2.793  1.997  0.46  0.79  0.44  0.72  1.87  1.17 
Village Wall Enclosure 2003-04  0.33  1.154  0  0  1.75  2.48  0  0  2.33  2.338  0.44  0.88  0.33  0.72  0  0  1.55  1.66  0  0 
Village Wall Enclosure 2003  0.16  0.57  0  0  0.87  1.24  0  0  1.16  1.16  0.222  0.440  0.13  0.35  0  0  0.77  .83  0  0 
Village Wall Enclosure 2004  0.16  0.57  0  0  0.87  1.24  0  0  1.16  1.16  0.222  0.440  .2  0.41  0  0  0.77  .83  0  0 
Note : Means apply for non-categorical data. Sums are calculated for categorical data. Standard deviations are calculated for the conflict variables at the village level  
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APPENDIX 4: ASSOCIATION ANALYSIS FOR INCOME SMOOTHING 
 
I. Income smoothing strategies vs. Risk events  
 
Table 1: Frequency distributions of income smoothing strategies across conflict-produced shocks (percentage) 
Conflict-produced shocks in 
2004 at the village level 
Adjusting household labour supply
1    Farming and breeding 
Used  Not 





Used  Not 
used  Not applicable 
Chi-square 
statistic & 
(Crammer’s V)  Nature Intensity
2   




Low  25 57  18 
28.354 
(V=0.03) 
  37 51  12 
829.618* 
(V=0.17) 
Medium   25  63  12    39  55  6 
High  24 57  19   11 67  22 




Low  23 58  19 
97.764* 
(V=0.05) 
  13 66  21 
1177.971* 
(V=0.21) 
Medium   24 64  12   48 41  11 
High  28 52  20   38 55  7 
 
 
        
    
 
Village sides 
enclosed by the 
Wall  
0 25  57  18 
183.527* 
(V=0.09) 
 30  56  14 
181.544* 
(V=0.09) 
1  34 54  12   16 67  17 
2  16 69  15   48 40  12 
3  5  69 25    19  60 20 
                   
Village within 1 
km to the Wall  
No  26 56  18 
22.931 
(V=.06) 
  30 56  14 
24.363 
(V=0.08)  Yes 21  62  17 
 24  60  16 
1. The income smoothing strategy ‘adjusting household labour supply’ includes: sending non-student family members to work, sending student family members 
to work, and searching for another job. For a discussion on this see the section 4.3.2.  
2. Low (the lowest 33% of the data), Medium (from 34% to the 66% of the data) & High (the highest 33% of the data) 
Note: * = significant at the 0.05 percentage level using the Pearson chi-square test 
 
 
II. Negative and significant conditional associations  
 
a) Farming & Violence across households 
 
Table 2: Percentage of use
1 of farming across village violence intensities for different groups of households
2 
1
st order control variables  Category
  Village Violence intensity
3 
Low   Medium   High  
Poverty line 
Poor  44 40  15 
Non-poor  35 38  10 
Location of  employment of household head (hh) 
Same locality  49 39  10 
Same governorate  25 31 5 
Employment status (hh) 
Unemployed  29 32  13 
Full-time employed  49 39  10 
Employment sector (hh) 
State company  38 35 9 
Government employee  31 39 8 
Household size
3  Medium   31 29  10 
High  43 53 5 
Education (hh) 
Illiterate  42 63  12 
High  39 40  12 
Sex (hh)  Male  39 41  10 
Land ownership 
Yes  58 60  31 
No  14 19 6 
Livestock ownership 
Yes  69 75  42 
No  19 11 6 
Location type 
Urban  22 46 9 
Refugee camp  1 5  8 
Village distance to the governorate capital
3  Medium  44 26  29 
Governorate  
Jenin  48 54  19 
Tulkarem  44 40  15 
Nablus  35 25 7 
Note 1: As a matter of simplification, this table does not include the three categories of the risk management strategy (used, not used, not applicable); instead it 
includes just the category of ‘used’. Since the percentages have been calculated across the strategy variable (used, not used, not applicable) and not across the 
village conflict intensities, the rows do not add up to 100%.  
Note 2: The control groups and their respective categories here included are just those that are statistically significant at the 0.05 percentage level using the 
Pearson chi-square test 




Table 3: Percentage of use
1of farming across village closure intensities for different groups of households
1
st order control variables  Category Village sides enclosed by the Wall 
0 1  2  3 
Poverty Poor  36 30  50  31 
Non-poor  28 12  46  20 
Maximum coping span  > 12 months  29 15  61  11 
< 4 months  36 5  46  8 
Dependency ratio (no. working family 
members/household size)
3 
High  27 8  54  16 
Low  39 12  44  11 
Employment status of household head (hh)  Unemployed  29 14  55  14 
Employment sector (hh)  State company  27 76  57  21 
Household size
3 High  34 18  43  11 
Education (hh)  Illiterate  37 12  63  14 
Land ownership  Yes  55 39  74  34 
No  25 34  18  4 
Livestock ownership  No  14 3  3  8 
Location type  Urban  21 5  no  observations  19 
Refugee camps  6 0  0  no  observations 
Village distance to the governorate capital  Low  7 2  0  19 
High  41 16  76  no  observations 
Governorate   Tulkarem  27 25  60  17 
Qalqilya  52 62  20  21 
Salfit  49  11  no observations  no observations 
Bethlehem  37 16  0  no  observations 
Explanations of table provided in Table 2 above 
 
 
Adjusting household labour supply (AHLS) & Village wall closure across households 
 
 
Table 4: Percentage of use of AHLS across village wall closure intensities for different groups of households
1
st order control variables  Category Villages sides enclosed by the wall 
0  1 2 3 
Poverty Poor  29  60 18 12 
Non-poor  24 27  14  4 
Maximum coping spam  > 12 months  21 19  18  2 
12 – 4 months  26  62 13 11 
In danger  31 39  0  0 
Dependency ratio (no. working family 
members/household size)
3 
High  26 30  12  0 
Medium  23 39  17  6 
Employment status of household head (hh)  Employed  25 35  16  5 
Employment sector (hh)  National company  27 30  19  5 
Employment location(hh)  Same locality  29 33  12  6 
Household size
3 25
th quartile (small)  17 21  22  1 
75th quartile   37 60  6  14 
Education (hh)  Illiterate  26  47 12 14 
Age
3 (hh) High  34 40  4  12 
Land ownership  No  25 34  18  4 
Livestock ownership  No  24 31  14  2 
Location type  Urban  25 28  No  observations  5 
Rural  26 49  14  No  observations 
Village distance to the governorate capital  Low  26 21  22  5 
High  25 54  20  No  observations 
Governorate   Jenin  33  No  observations 18 No  observations 
Ramallah  15  30  No observations  No observations 
Bethlehem  16 39  22  No  observations 






















st order conditional or control variables
2 
Associations  between income smoothing strategies and shocks
1 











Poverty aggregates        
Poverty   WT NO NO nesc  NO
Monthly consumption  WT NO nesc 
Max. coping period   WT NO OT  WT
Demographics     
Sex    nesc     
Age        nesc
Household size  WT WT nesc   WT
Education of the household head     
Education level   NO NO nesc   nesc
Employment of the household head     
Employment status  NO WT nesc nesc  nesc 
Job location   WT NO   nesc 
Employment sector   WT NO nesc nesc  nesc 
Dependency ratio   NO NO WT  NO
Assets     
Land ownership  NO NO WT nesc  nesc 
Livestock ownership  WT NO nesc nesc  nesc 
Location     
Location type  OT OT nesc OT  neo
Governorate  WT neo WT nesc  neo
Distance to the city  nesc neo neo OT  neo
1.  The conditional associations have been classified according to three type of behaviour, i.e. whether the relationship between income smoothing and shocks is 
alike across the categories of the conditional variable (NO-type), and if not, whether the difference lies in the direction (OT-type) or in the shape (WT-type) of the 
association. The type of behaviour is only written when the conditional associations are statistically significant at the 0.05 percentage using the Pearson chi-square 
test.  
2. Non-categorical variables have been converted into categorical variables and as for the intensity of the conflict-produced shocks, three categories have been 
established based on three cut off points: low (cut off lowest 33% of the data), medium (from 34% to 66% of the data), high (highest 33% of the data).   
Note ‘nesc’ stands for ‘not enough categories significant’ and denotes those cases where the conditional association is statistically significant in one of the categories 
of the group.  
Note ‘neo’ stands for ‘not enough observations’ and denotes those cases where one of the categories of the group lacks observations in any of three possible 
scenarios, i.e. low-, medium- and high-shock intensity.     
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APPENDIX 5: ASSOCIATION ANALYSIS FOR RISK-SHARING 
 
I. Risk-sharing strategies vs. Risk events across households 
 
Table 1: Frequency distributions of risk-sharing strategies across conflict-produced shocks (in percentage) 
Conflict-produced shocks in 2004 at 
the village level 
Community Risk-sharing
    Obtaining assistance from family and 
friends 
Used  Not used  Chi-square statistic & 
(Crammer’s V) 
 
Used  Not 
used 
Chi-square statistic & 
(Crammer’s V) 
Nature Intensity




              
Low 79  21 
107.983* 
(V=0.05) 
  12 88 
135.776* 
(V=0.10)  Medium 84  16    7  93 
High 70  30    19 81 




Low  68 32 
338.534* 
(V=0.14) 
  16 84 
68.9723** 
(V=0.07) 
Medium   87 13    10 90 
High 81  19    3  97 
                
Village sides 
enclosed by the 
Wall  
0 79  21 
175.667* 
(V=0.10) 
 14  86 
42.7507 
(V=0.05) 
1 69  31    8  92 





               
Village within 1 
km to the Wall  
No  79 21  87.308* 
(V=0.08) 
  14 86  14.1165 
(V=0.02)  Yes 69  31    11  89 
1. Low (the lowest 33% of the data), Medium (from 34% to the 66% of the data) & High (the highest 33% of the data) 
Note: * = significant at the 0.05 percent level using the Pearson chi-square test 
 
II. Positive conditional associations  
 
Community risk-sharing vs. Village closure intensity across households 
 
Table 2: Percentage of use
1 of community risk-sharing across village closure intensity for different households groups 
1
st order control variable  Category Village closure
3 
Low   Medium   High  
Poverty line  Poor  82 97  90 
Non-poor  65 81  79 
Maximum coping period  > 12 months  49 71  60 
4-12 months  78 88  92 
< 4 months  85 100  88 
Employment status  Partial employed  69 87  82 
Location of  employment of household head (hh)  Same locality  69 83  86 
Different 
governorate 
55 94  79 
Employment sector (hh)  State company  72 88  83 
Foreign company  75 96  89 
Government  60 73  82 
Household size
3 Low  63 81  82 
High  78 98  79 
Education (hh)  Illiterate  70 82  84 
High  68 93  89 
Sex (hh)  Male  69 88  82 
Land ownership  Yes  67 82  79 
No  89 93  85 
Livestock ownership  No  66 87  77 
Location type  Urban  64 86  82 
Rural  74 87  81 
Governorate Ramallah  56 80  77 
Bethlehem  71 89 No  observations 
Village distance to the governorate capital
3 Low  66 88 No  observations 
High  71 92  81 
Village population size
3 Low  75 88  78 
High  65 91  83 





Obtaining assistance from family and friends vs. Village violence across households 
 
Table 3: Percentage of use
 of community risk sharing across village violence intensity for different groups of households 
1
st order control variable  Category Violence
 
Low   Medium  High  
Poverty line  Poor  91 96  82 
Non-poor  75 78  68 
Location of  employment of household head (hh)  Same locality  81 90  68 
Employment sector (hh)  Foreign company  87 98  76 
Household size
3 Low  75 78  65 
Dependency ratio (no. working family 
members/household size)
3 
High  83 92  76 
Low  76 89  59 
Education (hh)  Illiterate  77 96  78 
High  88 68  67 
Sex (hh)  Male  80 83  71 
Land ownership  Yes  79 76  64 
No  78 91  72 
Livestock ownership  No  74 81  69 
Location type  Urban  71 91  66 
Rural  82 64  90 
Governorate Hebron  89 94  77 
Village distance to the governorate capital
3 Low  56 86  50 
High  83 68  97 
Village population size
3 Low  82 70  No  observations 
High  83 68  97 
For table description see Table 2 Appendix 4  
 












Community risk-sharing  
 
Obtaining assistance from 













closure  shock 
 
Poverty aggregates 
       
Poverty   nesc  NO nesc nesc NO nesc 
Max. coping period  nesc  WT OT NO OT WT
Demographics     
Sex    nesc  nesc  nesc  nesc nesc nesc
Household size  nesc  WT nesc nesc NO nesc
Education of the household head     
Education level   WT WT nesc NO nesc 
Employment of the household head     
Employment status   nesc OT NO nesc 
Job location   nesc  WT NO NO nesc 
Employment sector   nesc  WT nesc  nesc nesc 
Dependency ratio  NO nesc  nesc nesc  nesc
Assets     
Land ownership  WT NO nesc  nesc nesc 
Livestock ownership  nesc nesc nesc  nesc nesc 
Location     
Community population size  neo neo nesc nesc NO  nesc
Location type  OT NO neo NO NO  nesc
Governorate  nesc neo neo OT OT  WT
Distance to the city  OT neo nesc  nesc  NO 
For table description see similar table in Appendix 4 Part III.     